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Gordon v. Law Offices of Aguirre & Meyer3/18/1999
of equitable tolling applies to section 340.6 is a matter of statutory construction. In determining legislative intent, the reviewing court "look first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning." (Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 501.) The California Supreme Court, however, has already spoken regarding the exclusivity of the tolling provisions enumerated in section 340.6. In Laird v. Blacker, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 618, it explained: "Section 340.6, subdivision (a), states that 'in no event' shall the prescriptive period be tolled except under those circumstances specified in the statute. Thus, the Legislature expressly intended to disallow tolling under any circumstances not enumerated in the statute." (Italics added.)
In Bledstein v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 152, 160, the court likewise held "the tolling provisions contained in section 340.6 are exclusive. By including the limitation that 'in no event' shall the prescriptive period be tolled except under those circumstances specified in the statute, the Legislature expressed an intent to disallow tolling under any other circumstances." Accordingly, we conclude the doctrine of equitable tolling is inapplicable here, notwithstanding any lack of prejudice to Aguirre & Meyer occasioned by plaintiffs' filing of this lawsuit shortly after the Arizona case was dismissed.
Plaintiffs contend the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to section 340.5 , the statute of limitations for medical malpractice, in spite of similar "in no event" language, and thus it should apply equally in the legal malpractice context. In support, they cite Hull v. Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1328. Hull, however, does not even mention section 340.5. Rather, it concerns the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine to section 339, subdivision 1 (two-year limitations period for breach of oral contract) and section 340, subdivision (3) (one-year limitations period for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Neither of those statutes is remotely analogous to section 340.6. It has been held, in fact, that the "in no event" language of section 340.5 makes its enumerated tolling provisions exclusive. (Hollingsworth v. Kofoed (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 423, 427; Fogarty v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 316, 320.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants to recover costs on appeal from plaintiffs.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
WORK, Acting P.J.
McDONALD, J.
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