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Ex parte Walter Industries6/6/2003 Court stated:
"We opine that the legislature, in enacting Section 2, Local Act No. 213, in effect created two circuit courts within one county. By the Act, the Circuit Court holding in Bessemer was given the same power exercised by the Tenth Judicial Circuit, but it could exercise such power only for actions arising in its territorial boundary."
United Supply Co. v. Hinton Constr. & Dev., Inc., 396 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Ala. 1981).
In Glenn v. Wilson, 455 So. 2d 2 (Ala. 1984), Justice Shores noted that some of the cases interpreting the effect of the Act "are less than clear and seem to confuse venue and jurisdiction by use of the term 'territorial jurisdiction.'" 455 So. 2d at 4. Justice Shores concluded, "The Bessemer Cutoff legislation does not diminish the general jurisdiction of the other circuit courts, either in Jefferson or other counties"; instead, cases filed in the wrong division were subject to transfer, unless the parties waived the venue issue. Id. at 4-5. Subsequent decisions on the Bessemer/Birmingham Division venue issue have concluded that the Act controls venue between the divisions. See Ex parte World Omni Fin. Corp., 491 So. 2d 236, 237 (Ala. 1986)("Venue in this case is controlled by the local act creating the Bessemer Division."); Ex parte Jackson, 516 So. 2d 768, 769 (Ala. 1986)(agreeing that the Act "should be read as venue legislation rather than jurisdiction legislation and that the two divisions should be treated as if they were two separate counties"); Ex parte Johnson, 692 So. 2d 843, 845 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)("It is well established that the Bessemer Division is, in fact, a separate and distinct circuit with the same power exercised by the Tenth Judicial Circuit, ... and that the legislation creating the two divisions in Jefferson County is 'venue' legislation rather than 'jurisdiction' legislation.").
The petitioners in this case allege that the plaintiffs' causes of action arose outside of the Bessemer Division. In Ex parte Fields, this Court discussed where a cause of action "arises" within the context of the Act. In that case, the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission had rezoned a parcel of property lying in the Bessemer Division. Certain residents of the Bessemer Division challenged the rezoning ordinance in that court. The defendant, U.S. Steel, filed a motion to transfer the action to the Birmingham Division, arguing that the action did not "arise" in the Bessemer Division. In determining where the action arose, the Court stated:
"In Seaboard Surety Co. [v. William R. Phillips & Co., 279 Ala. 510, 187 So. 2d 264 (1966)], this court applied the general principles regarding the place where a cause of action arises as expressed in 92 C.J.S. Venue § 80, in determining the jurisdiction of the Bessemer Division. This court said:
"'At 92 C.J.S. Venue § 80, p. 776, speaking of statutes fixing venue as the county "where the cause of action arises" it is noted:
"'"A cause of action, within the meaning of statutes fixing the venue as the county where the cause of action arises has been said to consist of a duty on the part of one toward another and the violation or breach of that duty, or of plaintiff's primary right and the act or omission of defendant. ... It arises when that is not done which should have been done, or that is done which should not have been done. ... he cause of action accrues in the county in which defendant's wrongful act was done."
"'Relating these general principles to the case at hand, it seems reasonable to us ... that ... the cause of action "arose" within the meaning of the Bessemer Division Act within the Bessemer Division.'
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