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Ex parte Walter Industries6/6/2003
arate county] in Ex parte Fairfield-American Nat. Bank, 223 Ala. 252, 135 So. 447, decided in 1931."
243 Ala. at 514, 10 So. 2d at 751. Justice Foster then criticized the majority for overruling Ex parte Fairfield-American National Bank, 223 Ala. 252, 135 So. 447 (1931), and challenged the validity of relying upon Trieste & Co. v. Enslen, 106 Ala. 180, 17 So. 356 (1894), because " hat case did not consider venue, and had no such thought insofar as there manifested." 243 Ala. at 515, 10 So. 2d at 752.
We are now asked to apply the construction of § 2 limiting venue in the Bessemer Cutoff to claims arising in the Cutoff to a case that did not arise in either the Bessemer Division or the Birmingham Division of Jefferson County. None of the cases in which this rule has been applied deal with a claim arising in a county other than Jefferson County. If we apply this reading of § 2 to cases arising outside Jefferson County, we will have created narrower venue for Alabama citizens who happen to reside in the Bessemer Cutoff than is applicable to all other citizens of this State. I am reluctant to endorse such disparate treatment unless a clear legislative command requires such a result. I cannot conclude that stare decisis requires application of the rule urged on us by the defendants where the factual footing for the rule--claims arising in different parts of Jefferson County--is not present in this case.
Justice Foster noted that the alternative rule accepted by the majority in Ex parte Central of Georgia Railway confined causes of action that may arise in the Bessemer Division to that court and eliminated the Birmingham Division from considering causes of action that arose in the Bessemer Division, though the parties may all reside in Birmingham. Here we are not concerned with eliminating the Birmingham Division from considering a cause of action that arose in the Bessemer Cutoff. As previously noted, we are here dealing with a cause of action that did not arise in either division of Jefferson County.
Rather than apply to significantly different circumstances what is at best a less than obvious response to a legislative command, I would interpret § 2 of the Act as though it created a separate county for venue purposes in the context of claims not arising in Jefferson County. Section 2, after having provided that "jurisdiction and power shall be exclusive in, limited to, and extend over that portion of the territory of [the Bessemer Cutoff,]" concludes with the statement that "all jurisdiction and power exercised therein at the time of the passage of this act by the circuit court of Jefferson county, as now held at Birmingham, and the common law jurisdiction and power of the city court of Birmingham is hereby expressly excluded." (Emphasis added.) I would interpret the references to exclusivity in § 2 as exclusive of that portion of Jefferson County not in the Bessemer Cutoff, and not exclusive of claims that might otherwise be appropriate under general venue laws not in conflict with the provisions for exclusivity within the divisions of Jefferson County. Under this construction of § 2, citizens residing in the Bessemer Cutoff would enjoy the same venue privileges of all other citizens with respect to claims arising outside of the county in which they reside. The defendants, relying solely on the claim's having arisen outside the Bessemer Cutoff, have failed to demonstrate improper venue.
With respect to the denial of the motion to transfer venue pursuant to § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, for the convenience of parties and witnesses or in the interest of justice, I would deny the petition for failure of the defendants to show a clear legal right to such relief.
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