 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Malovec v. Hamrell3/1/1999
e harbor provisions preclude a party from seeking monetary sanctions for an offending pleading following a dispositive ruling by the trial court on the pleading. (Goodstone v. Southwest Airline Co., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th 406; Cromwell v. Cummings, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10; Barber v. Miller (9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 707; Ridder v. City of Springfield, supra, 109 F.3d 288.) The question presented is whether the same limitation is applicable to sanctions initiated by the trial court. We can discern no reason for a different rule. The two safe harbor provisions are substantially the same.
Dr. Hamrell reiterates various policy arguments, which the appellate courts have already rejected in the context of motions brought by a party, as justification for ignoring the safe harbor provisions in the context of motions initiated by the trial court. He argues that application of the safe harbor provisions in this situation renders section 128.7 an empty formality and undermines the purpose of the statute. These arguments do not bear close scrutiny. First, the safe harbor provisions in question are expressly part of the section of the statute applicable to sanctions motions by the court. They have not been implied or engrafted from generic provisions. Thus, the statute is clear and unambiguous on this issue. Second, the purpose of section 128.7 is to promote compliance. To this end, the statute permits withdrawal of a challenged pleading. Once the pleading has been ruled on dispositively, withdrawal is ineffective and compliance is not possible. At this point, imposition of sanctions becomes strictly punitive, not an intended purpose of the statute. Finally, the purpose of the statute is more clearly effectuated by an early sanctions motion brought by a party prior to a motion for summary judgment. Such an early motion prevents the undue costs and delay engendered by pursuit of a frivolous action to a ruling on a dispositive motion.
Dr. Hamrell raises one further contention worthy of brief Discussion. He contends that interpretation of the safe harbor provisions to preclude the imposition of sanctions, under these circumstances, renders another provision of the statute surplusage. He points to section 128.7, subdivision (d)(2), which prohibits a trial court from initiating a monetary sanctions motion against a party after the party has voluntarily dismissed or settled the action. The purpose of this subdivision is to protect parties who settle a case from later facing unexpected monetary sanctions which might, if known, have affected their willingness to settle or dismiss the action. (See Com. Notes on 1993 Amendments to Rule 11.) It appears that the voluntary dismissal/settlement subdivision may very well be surplusage. We can discern no situation in which sanctions following a voluntary dismissal or settlement would not be precluded by both the safe harbor provisions and the voluntary dismissal/settlement provisions. This duplicativeness may be the result of timing and inadvertence. The voluntary dismissal/settlement provision is included in Rule 11 and was part of section 128.7 from the outset. Rule 11 does not include a safe harbor limitation on motions initiated by the court. The provision of section 128.7 adding a safe harbor period to court initiated sanctions was inserted at a later time, and the drafters may not have recognized the effect of the safe harbor provisions on the voluntary dismissal/settlement provisions. In any event, the safe harbor provisions are express and unambiguous. The fact that their enforcement renders another provision duplicative does not nullify the express language. An appellate court is to interpret a statute where possible to avoid surplus language. (Arnett v. Dal Cielo (
Page 1 2 3 4 5 California Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|