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Stock v. Kino Community Hospital6/24/2003
e claim against defendants.
We reach a contrary conclusion, however, on Stock's second malpractice claim. This claim stated that the County had exposed him to "a hazardous condition of walking across a tile floor with a wet foot by failing to ascertain the rabies status of the dog." The trial court ruled that Stock required an expert to establish the standard of care for treating his dog bite, reasoning as follows:
When a [person] has been bitten by a dog and potentially exposed to the rabies virus, the standard of care may or may not require a reasonable and prudent healthcare provider to personally check on the status of the dog's vaccinations. Obviously, whether this is within the purview of the healthcare provider, the patient, or either or both, can only be established by expert testimony.... The diagnosis and potential treatment options which would be given to the plaintiff obviously vary significantly when it can be conclusively shown that the dog was appropriately vaccinated for rabies a situation where the identity of the dog is unknown or it is conclusively established that the dog was in fact rabid. These determinations, as well as the appropriate treatment protocols, are in the nature of matters involving expertise in healthcare.
We agree with the trial court's reasoning, and the case law supports it. See Bell v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 157 Ariz. 192, 755 P.2d 1180 (App. 1988) (because health care provider's standard of care is based on acceptable conduct of other such providers in similar circumstances, plaintiff must present evidence of accepted professional conduct to enable jury to determine applicable standard); Potter v. H. Kern Wisner, M.D., P.C., 170 Ariz. 331, 333, 823 P.2d 1339, 1341 (App. 1991) (expert testimony necessary to establish "the general standard of care exercised by physicians in the defendant's field of practice under similar circumstances"). The trial court thus properly applied the law in ruling that Stock required an expert on his second malpractice claim.
Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment against Stock on the second malpractice claim but, for the reasons stated above, reverse summary judgment on the first malpractice claim involving the absorbency of the material Stock was given to dry his foot and remand that claim for further proceedings in the trial court.
WILLIAM E. DRUKE, Judge (Retired)
CONCURRING:
PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Chief Judge
M. JAN FLUREZ, Judge
Page 1 2 3 4 Arizona Personal Injury Attorneys
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