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Springdale Donuts Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.3/2/1999
not apply to "` ersonal injury' consisting of discrimination directly or indirectly related to the employment or prospective employment of any person or persons by any insured." (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff contends that the personal injury provisions of the umbrella policy obligated the defendants to defend the plaintiff against the underlying claims because those claims alleged discrimination on the basis of sex. The defendants argue, to the contrary, that, because the underlying complaints were brought to remedy discrimination directly related to the claimants' employment, those claims specifically are excluded from umbrella policy coverage by exclusion 3 (h). The plaintiff concedes that the defendants' interpretation of the scope of exclusion 3 (h) is plausible, but argues that the exclusion applies only to discriminatory hiring practices. We recognize that if an exclusion clause is ambiguous, it must be construed against the drafter. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. v. State, supra, 246 Conn. 325. "The fact that the parties advocate different meanings of exclusion clause [however] does not necessitate a Conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Figueiredo, supra, 223 Conn. 37. In our view, the terms of exclusion 3 (h) are clear and unambiguous and, therefore, leave no room for construction. The exclusion explicitly precludes coverage for personal injuries that arise out of sex discrimination during employment, as well as personal injuries that arise out of sex discrimination during hiring.
The underlying complaints alleged that the claimants were subjected to discrimination during their employment at the shop. Specifically, the complaints alleged that the "action [were] brought to remedy discrimination on the basis of sex in the terms, conditions and privileges of employment . . . ." The claims, therefore, were within policy exclusion 3 (h). Consequently, the plaintiff's umbrella policy did not provide coverage for the claims made in the underlying complaints.
The plaintiff also maintains that the underlying claims are within the purview of the bodily injury provisions of the umbrella policy. "Bodily injury" is defined in the umbrella policy as "bodily injury, shock, fright, mental injury, disability, mental anguish, humiliation, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at any time." Exclusion 3 (c) of the umbrella policy provides, however, that the policy does not apply to "` odily injury' consisting of humiliation, mental injury or mental anguish directly or indirectly related to the employment of any person or persons by any insured."
The underlying complaints alleged injuries consisting of "mental anxiety, distress of mind and humiliation." The plaintiff concedes that exclusion 3 (c) explicitly precludes coverage for the claims of humiliation, but argues that the exclusion does not preclude coverage for the claims of mental anxiety or distress of mind. The plaintiff acknowledges that an ordinary reading of the term "mental injury " in exclusion 3 (c) would include mental anxiety and distress of mind. The plaintiff argues, however, that the use of the words "mental anguish" in the policy directly after the term "mental injury" indicates an intention to limit the meaning of "mental injury" to "mental anguish."
In our view, however, the language of the policy exclusion unambiguously evidences an intent to exclude from policy coverage claims for humiliation, mental injury and mental anguish. If the term "mental anguish" had been intended to explain, rather than supplement, the term "mental injury," the policy would have stated "humiliation or mental
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