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[T] Schlader v. Interstate Power Co.3/24/1999
are, that defendant failed to comply with those standards, and that Interstate's failure to do so was a proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages."
We think, although expert testimony would clearly be helpful to fact finders in such a claim, it is not a condition precedent. Expert testimony is required in actions based upon the negligence of a professional. See Wilson v. Darr, 553 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1996) (expert testimony required in professional negligence suit against licensed counselor); Kennis v. Mercy Hosp. Med. Ctr., 491 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1992) (expert testimony required in medical malpractice case); Eventide Lutheran Home v. Smithson Elec. & Gen. Constr., Inc., 445 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 1989) (expert testimony required in action against engineering firm to prove specific negligence).
It is the complexity of professional negligence cases that requires expert testimony. IPC argues that stray-voltage cases are technical in nature and thus require such testimony. Although testimony of witnesses having specialized education and training, or special experience and knowledge, is often admitted into evidence on the ground of necessity, it is not necessarily required merely because a case involves matters of science, special skill, special learning, knowledge, or experience which may be difficult for jurors to comprehend. 31A Am. Jur. 2d ยง 40, at 49.
Causes of action which predicate recovery upon expert testimony are rare. Salem v. United States Lime Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S. Ct. 1119, 1122, 8 L. Ed. 2d 313, 317 (1962) (in suit by seaman expert testimony regarding naval architecture and safety devices not necessary). Salem stands for the rule that expert testimony is generally unnecessary and may be properly excluded:
"if all the primary facts can be accurately and intelligibly described to the jury, and if they, as men of common understanding, are as capable of comprehending the primary facts and of drawing correct Conclusions from them as are witnesses possessed of special or peculiar training, experience, or observation in respect of the subject under investigation." Id.
The subject of stray voltage is certainly technical. But the nature of electricity and the results of contact with it by humans and animals is not beyond a common person's understanding. We reject IPC's contention that expert testimony is required in a stray-voltage case.
V. Because expert testimony is not required, the case should not have been dismissed. Every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence should be afforded the nonmoving party. Knapp v. Simmons, 345 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Iowa 1984). A fact question is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved. Id. The Schladers cited evidence by the milking equipment supplier that he discerned the voltage problems on their farm. There were also depositions of analysts reciting that the isolator or block installed by IPC did decrease the voltage in the Schladers' milking parlor. There was also testimony from a veterinarian that related the health problems experienced by the Schladers' dairy herd. He also noted the improvement in the milking herd after the block or insulator was installed. According the Schladers' "every legitimate inference" from their evidence, it cannot be said they have failed to show injuries to the dairy herd resulting from electric voltage in the milking parlor.
The case must be remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Tax costs fifty percent to the Schladers; fifty percent to Interstate.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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