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Cook v. Burnette6/26/2003
es the legislature allow for the filing of a motion to challenge a judgment on voidness grounds. Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 105. Accordingly, the court concluded that the petition seeking to void the trial court's judgment:
" as one which sought post-judgment relief under section 2-1401 and could validly be brought outside the two-year limitations period. Also, there was no need for the Board to establish that it had acted with due diligence or to allege that a meritorious defense existed. Because the * motion was a valid section 2-1401 motion, the trial court's order granting the * motion to vacate is, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3), a final, appealable order." Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 105.
In the case at bar, we already have found that Sarkissian compels a finding that the banks' petitions are to be construed as section 2-1401 motions and that the trial court's order granting them is final and appealable under Rule 304(b)(3). In addition, because the banks' petitions were filed for the purpose of seeking to vacate a void order, we must categorize them as section 2-1401(f) motions. And according to Sarkissian, section 2-1401(f) motions to vacate void orders are no longer amenable to the due diligence, meritorious defense, or two-year time requirements. Therefore, plaintiff's argument that the banks' motions were untimely is simply not well-taken.
Next, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the $800,000 default judgments against the defendant banks were void for three reasons: (1) the trial court failed to consider the complaint in its entirety, where it looked only to the ad damnum clause in reaching its conclusion; (2) the banks' conduct after being served with the complaint shows they knew that plaintiff was seeking relief from them; and (3) it was contrary to the public policy of protecting the stability and finality of judgments.
First, plaintiff notes that it is well established that a complaint must be considered as a whole and not in its disconnected parts. Denkewalter v. Wolberg, 82 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572 (1980). Put another way, plaintiff claims, " o see if a cause of action has been stated the whole complaint must be considered, rather than taking a myopic view of a disconnected part." People ex rel. Scott v. College Hills Corp., 91 Ill. 2d 138, 145 (1982), citing Stenwall v. Bergstrom, 398 Ill. 377 (1947). Therefore, plaintiff claims, the trial court erred in focusing entirely on the absence of the banks' names from the ad damnum clause and in failing to address whether the body of the complaint reasonably informed the banks that the plaintiff was seeking to impose monetary liability against them.
The trial court's interpretation, plaintiff asserts, is also contrary to established case law. See Charles v. Gore, 248 Ill. App. 3d 441, 449 (1993) (a default judgment was not void, although complaint did not ask for specific monetary relief); Joseph A. Thorsen Co. v. Evans, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1119 (1980) (default judgment in compensatory damages was not void even though the complaint did not per se request a specific amount in compensatory damages). Therefore, in properly looking at the entire complaint, plaintiff argues that we should find that the defendant banks had adequate notice of the potential of the imposition of monetary damages against them, that the banks could not have been surprised by the default judgment, and that the trial court's entry of that default judgment was in no way void.
In addressing the body of the complaint, plaintiff directs us to paragraph 10 of the wrongful death count of his complaint, which alleges that the decedent's next of kin "suffered great losses of a personal an
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