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Cook v. Burnette6/26/2003
ng v. Stevens, 216 Ill. App. 3d 299 (1991), did not even involve a default judgment, as the defendant had appeared and argued the elements of the case.
Accordingly, we disagree with plaintiff's contention that pleading the prima facie elements of his causes of actions substitutes for, or excuses him from, compliance with Rule 105. See Park Avenue Lumber, 76 Ill. App. 2d 334 (court vacated as void a portion of a default order in a mechanic's lien action barring the collection of a debt, even though the pleadings alluded to a debt running to a defaulted party, because the complaint did not request that the party be barred from making a claim for money due it); Palatine Savings & Loan, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 437-40 (court vacated as void a default judgment for failure to comply with Rule 105 despite a general prayer for relief of a deficiency judgment and a copy of the defendant's consent to the deficiency judgment which was attached as an exhibit to the complaint, because the complaint did not request a deficiency judgment from the defaulted party). Ultimately, after reviewing the record in this case, we find no evidence that plaintiff has, in fact, complied with Rule 105. In fact, it is undisputed that plaintiff never submitted a Rule 105 letter to either of the banks, as he never sought to amend his complaint. Accordingly, plaintiff's argument must fail.
For the same reasons that plaintiff is unable to meet Rule 105's requirements through a liberal reading of his complaint, his argument that "the banks' conduct after being served with the complaint shows they knew that plaintiff was seeking relief from them" is equally untenable. Regardless of what either of the banks or the banks' officers "knew" about plaintiff's complaint, the fact remains that complaint simply did not pray for relief against them. And where plaintiff never sought to amend his complaint or give notice pursuant to Rule 105 that the banks were being added as entities from which the plaintiff was potentially seeking relief, plaintiff again cannot demonstrate his compliance with Rule 105.
Lastly, plaintiff contends that " t is the public policy of our courts to give the stability and finality of judgments more weight than the validity of judgments." And, in light of the fact that the banks brought their petition to vacate more than two years after section 2-1401's time requirement, plaintiff asserts that the defendant banks should not be able to circumvent those time restrictions simply by seeking to declare the judgment void. We note that the supreme court in Sarkissian expressly held that any petitions brought on voidness grounds are not subject to the two-year time limitation, and are not required to assert a meritorious defense or due diligence. Thus, it appears the supreme court has placed a greater emphasis on the importance of correcting void orders than on the concern of "undermin the stability of judgments" and "open the flood gates to litigation." As this is one of those instances where a party has brought a motion to vacate on voidness grounds, plaintiff's argument is not well taken.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.
Affirmed.
QUINN and REID, JJ., concur.
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