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Martin v. Beverage Capital Corporation3/25/1999
on the deceased worker's salary at the time of death.
In the instant case, pursuant to 9-679, Mrs. Martin's dependency was determined at the time of her husband's death, which was the same time as the accident. In the recent case of Meadowood v. Keller, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (199__)(Slip Op. No. 52, 1998 Term), we also construed dependency in the Act to turn on the timing of the event giving rise to the benefit. Mrs. Keller was injured in a job -related accident and later died of an unrelated cause. At the time of the accident, her son was not financially dependent on her, but he later became so after he left his job to live with and take care of her. Using 9-679, which covers death benefits, as a guide in construing Md. Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Labor and Employment Art., 9-632, which deals with permanent partial disability benefits, we held that the dependency of Mrs. Keller's son turned on his circumstances at the time of her accident and not at the time of her death. Keller, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Slip Op. No. 52, 1998 Term at 20). We noted that 9-679 mandates application of the facts existing at the time of the accident that caused the death of the employee in dependency determinations and held that dependency for the purposes of 9-632 must also be determined as of the date of the accident. Keller, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Slip Op. No. 52, 1998 Term at 7-8). This Court stated: " e are unable to discern any evidence that the Legislature desired to have the term 'dependent' mean one thing for purposes of the death benefits and another for purposes of the survived benefit, nor have we been able to determine any compelling reason why it would have wanted to have different standards apply." Keller, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Slip Op. No. 52, 1998 Term at 19-20). Like we held in Keller, we believe that 9-681(d) should be construed to turn on the timing of the event giving rise to the benefit.
Respondents further propose that, in determining whether Mrs. Martin "continues to be wholly dependent," we should look at Mrs. Martin's current income and compare it to the maximum benefits available under the statewide average weekly wage pursuant to Md. Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Labor and Employment Art., 9-602 and COMAR 14.09.01.07. Respondents maintain that if Mrs. Martin's current income constitutes a significant percentage of the statewide average weekly wage, then she is no longer dependent on the workers' compensation death benefits and is therefore not wholly dependent. We decline to adopt Respondents' proposed formula for calculating whether a claimant "continues to be wholly dependent" under 9-681(d). Rather, the correct formula to apply in making ongoing dependency determinations is to compare the amount earned by the worker at the time of death with the amount the surviving spouse earns after the $45,000 has been paid.
In Martin, the court based its holding in part on a detailed hypothetical regarding two surviving spouses whose deceased spouses made very differing salaries when they were alive, resulting in a more frequent finding of "continues to be wholly dependent" on the part of the wealthier surviving spouse. The court stated:
"If we were to adopt [Mrs. Martin's] reading of 9-681(d), persons whose spouses earn huge incomes would be more likely to be able to convince the Commission that they continue to be wholly dependent than those with modest income. This would produce an illogical and unjust result and one at odds with the purpose of the Act." Martin, 119 Md. App. at 673, 705 A.2d at 1181.
We do not feel it necessary to refute the court's hypothetical point-by-point, but instead rely on four safeg
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