Martin v. Beverage Capital Corporation3/25/1999
ut of and in the course of employment, to provide vocational rehabilitation, and to provide adequate medical services." Id. Moreover, as we stated in Beth.-Fair. Shipyard v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416, 45 A.2d 79 (1945):
"The Workmen's Compensation Act is essentially social legislation and the provisions thereof are to be liberally construed. It must be interpreted to effectuate its general purpose and not strictly construed. Where there is a conflict in the Workmen's Compensation law, questions of construction should be resolved in favor of the claimant." (Citations omitted). 185 Md. at 425, 45 A.2d at 83.
When we interpret a statute in order to effectuate its goal, our primary concern is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Regarding this task, we have previously stated: "The search for legislative intent begins, and ordinarily ends, with the words of the statute under review." Schuman, Kane v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119, 668 A.2d 929, 931 (1995). A statute may contain ambiguous language, requiring us to look beyond its plain language to discern intent. Where the statutory language is unambiguous and expresses a plain and definite meaning, however, we need not look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent. Marriott Employees v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997).
In determining legislative intent, we must never lose sight of the overriding purpose and goal of the statute. As we observed in Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987), the search for legislative intent is most accurately characterized "as an effort to `seek to discern some general purpose, aim, or policy reflected in the statute.'" 309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632 (quoting Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposal for a Change in Maryland's Statutes Quo, 43 Md. Law Rev. 647, 653 (1984)). In addition, when interpreting a statute and determining legislative intent, "the entire statutory scheme [must be examined], as opposed to scrutinizing parts of a statute in isolation." Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 15-16, 616 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1992).
Once we determine that the statutory language at issue is in accordance with the legislature's intended purpose in enacting the statute, our task of interpretation is complete. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994)("If the language of the statute is plain and clear and expresses a meaning consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, no further analysis is ordinarily required."); Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171-72, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991)("When the language is clearly consistent with the apparent purpose of the statute and the result is not absurd, no further research is required.").
Thus, in interpreting and determining legislative intent, we must look to the plain language of the enactment, while keeping in mind its overall purpose and aim. Only when both of these tasks are done concurrently do we obtain an accurate interpretation of the statute. In light of these guiding principles of statutory interpretation, we now proceed to a discussion of the Maryland law that is pertinent to our analysis of 9-681(d). As we do so, we must be keenly aware that " he Workers' Compensation statute should be liberally construed so that any ambiguity, uncertainty or conflict is resolved in favor of the claimant, in order to effect the statute's benevolent purposes." Linder Crane Service Co. v. Hogan, 86 Md. App. 438, 443, 586 A.2d 1290, 1292 (1991)(footnote omitted).
B. Maryland Workers' Compensation Law
1. Background
In Maryland, there is a two-step process for determining the
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|