 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
People v. Perkins6/18/2003
ctly affect the performance of his official duties.
The mere coincidence that a crime has been committed by one who happens to be a public officer is not sufficient to establish official misconduct. For this offense it is necessary not only that the offender be an officer, or one who presumes to act as an officer, but the misconduct, if not actually in the exercise of the duties of his office, must be done under color of his office. On the other hand the act of one who is an officer, which act is done because he is an officer or because of the opportunity afforded by that fact, is under color of his office despite his gesture of removing his badge plus his statement that he is not acting in the name of the law. [Perkins, p 541].
With this understanding, we now consider whether there was enough evidence to bind over defendant.
2. There is insufficient evidence to bind over defendant for misconduct in office
To be guilty of misconduct in office, one must first be a public officer. In this case, defendant is a deputy sheriff. In Coutu I, we held that a deputy sheriff is a public officer for purposes of misconduct in office when the allegations against him arise from the performance of his official duties. Coutu I, supra at 357-358.
Although defendant is a deputy sheriff, there is no evidence that his alleged conduct arose from the performance of his official duties. Rather, the charged conduct arose from a longstanding sexual relationship with the complainant. It is undisputed that defendant was on duty when he engaged in the conduct. However, the prosecutor presented no evidence correlating that conduct with defendant's public office. The act was neither initiated nor consummated in the exercise of defendant's duties. It is not alleged that the opportunity to commit the specific corrupt behavior in question, when it occurred, arose from or was furthered by defendant's status as a deputy sheriff. Whatever influence defendant's office may once have had on the complainant, there was no evidence that it influenced her to have sexual relations with defendant on the subject occasion.
In short, the prosecutor failed to offer evidence establishing a nexus between defendant's alleged conduct and defendant's status as a sheriff's deputy. From that we conclude that defendant was not acting as a public officer for purposes of misconduct in office. Coutu I, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision regarding this issue on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of misconduct in office.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence of coercion to sustain the charge of CSC-I against defendant. Because the prosecutor failed to meet this burden, we need not reach the question whether psychological subjugation is a viable theory of coercion.
We also hold that the evidence presented at the preliminary examination did not establish probable cause to believe that defendant committed the common-law offense of misconduct in office.
The Court of Appeals decision in this case is accordingly reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Page 1 2 3 4 Michigan Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|