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In re Marriage of Raymond J. Tullier3/17/1999
y 57.63% of the debt[.]"
"This distribution divides total net marital assets of $531,000.00 between the parties, with $265,500.00 (50%) awarded to [Raymond] and $265,500.00 (50%) awarded to [Elizabeth]."
Raymond's first point relied on:
"In its judgment of dissolution of marriage in which the court ordered the division of property, the trial court erred in classifying all of the assets from [Raymond's] personal injury award as marital property rather than all or a substantial portion as separate property because, pursuant to the analytic method of classification of property, established that all or a substantial portion of the assets were separate property in that presented clear and convincing evidence that the assets from the award were for lost eye, disability, and for future lost wages."
The "analytic method" of classifying money recovered by a spouse in a claim for bodily injuries sustained during marriage is explained in Mistler, 816 S.W.2d 241, cited in the excerpt from the trial court's judgment (quoted earlier). Under that approach, the purpose for which the recovery is received controls its classification. Id. at 247. A recovery, or portion thereof, is classified as that which it is intended to replace. Id. To the extent the recovery compensates for losses to the marital estate, it is marital property. Id. To the extent the recovery compensates for losses to a spouse's separate estate, it is his or her separate property. Id.
In Mistler, the issue, as set forth in the opinion, was whether post-dissolution annuity payments to the husband replaced only his post-dissolution non-economic and economic damages and, therefore, were properly designated as non-marital property by the trial court. Id. The appellate court, upon review of the record, held the trial court's designation was correct. Id. at 252.
Other cases illustrate how the analytic method enables courts to classify bodily injury recoveries as marital or non-marital property in dissolution actions.
In Hudson v. Hudson, 865 S.W.2d 405 (Mo.App. W.D. 1993), the husband was injured on the job ; the injury left him unable to resume his occupation. Id. at 407. One of the fringe benefits of his job at the time of his injury was a "Supplemental Fund" administered by his union. Id. at 406. The husband was entitled to payments from the fund upon becoming totally and permanently disabled from performing union work. Id. at 407. He argued the payments were to compensate him for lost future earning capacity (and thus non-marital property); his wife insisted the payments were a retirement plan (and thus marital property). Id. The appellate court held there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the payments were to compensate the husband for lost future earning capacity, hence the trial court did not err in classifying such payments as non-marital. Id. at 407-08.
In Pauley v. Pauley, 771 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.App. E.D. 1989), the issue was whether a "lump sum" award of workers' compensation benefits and an award against the Second Injury Fund were marital property. Id. at 107. Applying the analytic approach, the appellate court held "the lump sum awards to husband of workers' compensation benefits and of the Second Injury Fund are non-marital assets to be set aside to husband as his separate property to the extent these awards compensate husband for future loss of earnings that have accrued since the dissolution of the parties' marriage." Id. at 109-10. However, the portion of the awards that compensated the husband for wages lost during the marriage are marital property, as they replaced wages he would have earned before the dissolutio
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