 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Hoskins .v Business Men's Assurance6/30/2003
t [he thought was] something that would be curative of what happened in the rebuttal argument. And it can be done in the second phase right now. [He was] not saying anything about what should normally be in the second phase." Defendants explained that they were once again seeking to "solve that misinformation real easily by letting the jury know that we turned over everything to our experts that was sent to us by the plaintiffs." The trial court eventually ruled that there would "be no evidence allowed [other] than financial, pertaining to the financial condition of the defendant."
We are limited to reviewing what was before the trial court. Although Defendants' point on appeal is termed as being a complaint that the trial court erred in limiting the evidence to be presented in the second phase of the bifurcated trial to evidence relevant to Defendants' financial condition, Defendants' true complaint at trial was merely a continuing objection to Plaintiffs' final closing argument concerning the slides and their final attempt to rebut that argument. Given our previous discussion of and holding regarding Plaintiffs' final closing argument in light of the circumstances at trial, we do not feel it is necessary to discuss this issue in depth.
It is within the trial court's discretion to admit evidence, and the evidence sought to be admitted must be relevant to the issue at hand. Keene , 855 S.W.2d at 367 (explaining that " he test for relevancy is whether an offered fact tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue or corroborates other evidence"). The evidence Defendants sought to introduce concerning who was allegedly responsible for obtaining the slides was relevant to Defendants' theory that Mr. Hoskins did not suffer from mesothelioma, an issue for the first phase of the trial. It was not relevant to T&N;s failure to manufacture a safe product or warn persons of the dangers of its products -- the conduct for which the jury found Defendants' liable for punitive damages in the first phase of the trial and for which it determined the amount of the punitive damages award in phase two of the trial.
The trial court did not abuse this discretion in refusing to allow Defendants to put on evidence about the stipulation and slides provided by Plaintiffs in the second phase of the bifurcated trial.
Point denied.
Prejudgment Interest Not Allowed on Punitive Damages
In their final point on appeal before this court, Defendants challenge the trial court's judgment for prejudgment interest. They allege the prejudgment interest is not authorized in this case under Missouri law because (1) the judgment amount did not exceed Plaintiffs' demand for payment as required to recover prejudgment interest under section 408.040.2 RSMo 2000; and (2) a prejudgment interest award on a judgment consisting solely of punitive damages does not serve the public policies on which section 408.040.2 is based. As explained below, we agree with Defendants' latter assertion, and, therefore, reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment awarding prejudgment interest on the $7 million punitive damages judgment. Because of this conclusion, Defendants' first argument becomes moot.
A. The Prejudgment Interest Statute:
Section 408.040.2 provides:
In tort actions, if a claimant has made a demand for payment of a claim or an offer of settlement of a claim, to the party, parties or their representatives and the amount of the judgment or order exceeds the demand for payment or offer of settlement, prejudgment interest, at the rate specified in subsection 1 of this section, shall be calculated from a date sixty days after the demand or offer
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Missouri Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|