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Dangerfield v. City of Kansas City6/30/2003
Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Howard, P.J., and Hardwick, J., concur.
Opinion:
Emet Dangerfield appeals the granting of City of Kansas City's second motion for new trial. Six months earlier, Dangerfield had obtained a verdict, for the wrongful death of his daughter, against the respondent, City of Kansas City, based upon a dangerous condition of city property. Dangerfield contends that when it purported to grant the City's second motion, the trial court did not have jurisdiction.Factual and Procedural History On July 12, 1999, Emet Dangerfield's ten-year-old daughter was struck and killed by a motorist whose view, Dangerfield averred in this wrongful death suit brought pursuant to section 537.080, RSMo. (1994), against the City of Kansas City ("City"), was obstructed by the extremely long grass and weeds on its property. Appellant's daughter was riding her bicycle at the intersection of 45th and Bales in Kansas City. There were no signals or stop signs at the intersection. On August 8, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dangerfield, assessing damages at $843,333.33. The jury attributed thirty-two percent fault to the City and sixty-eight percent fault to Dangerfield's daughter. Fourteen days after the verdict, on August 22nd, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Emet Dangerfield in the sum of $269,866.67.
Nearly one month later, on September 20th, the City filed a "motion to amend judgment to conform with the limits of section 537.610(2), RSMo 1994." Section 537.610.2 limits the liability of the public entities for damages in tort actions. The next day, September 21st, the City moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.) and, alternatively, for a new trial. One of the twelve grounds for a new trial was that a juror had visited the scene of the incident during an overnight recess and later told the other jury members that a stop sign had been placed at the intersection after the accident. A juror affidavit was submitted in support of this allegation.
On November 29th, the trial court, in a ruling captioned an "order," denied the City's motion for J.N.O.V. or in the alternative, for a new trial, but granted the motion to cap damages at $100,000--without elaborating the basis for its decision. After a call to the division clerk or to the judge--the parties disagree as to which happened and the record is silent--the trial court, on December 10th, issued another ruling, identical to the November 29th "Order," except that it was now designated a "Judgment."
On December 20th, the City re-filed a verbatim copy of its earlier motion for new trial, including the suggestions (with the minor exception of one additional ground). Later that day, the City filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. On February 21, 2002, the trial court, now finding that there had been jury misconduct, granted the City's second motion for a new trial.
On April 17, 2002, this court granted the City's motion to voluntarily dismiss its appeal. See Rule 84.09. Dangerfield appeals the trial court's decision to grant a new trial. See section 512.020, RSMo. (2000). A timeline of relevant events appears within the analysis.Analysis On appeal, Dangerfield challenges the trial court's jurisdiction to grant the City's second motion for new trial. See section 512.020, RSMo. (2000). The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Ferrier , 86 S.W.3d 125, 127 (Mo. App. 2002) . This court must construe these rules so as "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Rule 41.03. Dan gerfield argues that the August 22nd judgment became final on November 2
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