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Dangerfield v. City of Kansas City6/30/2003
udgment under Rule 78.07(c). Failure to specifically rely on Rule 78.07(c) in seeking to amend a judgment is sufficient to deny a party the benefits of Rule 78.07(c). Hart, 41 S.W.3d at 512 (holding the same about former Rule 73.01(a)(5), the precursor of Rule 78.07); State, Dep't. of Labor & Indus. Relations v. Ron Woods Mech., Inc. , 926 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Mo. App. 1996) . Hence, the City does not get the benefit of filing a second motion for new trial.
A second problem with the City's position is that the operation of the November 29th order reducing the damages in the August 22nd judgment to conform with Section 537.610(2), RSMo. (1994), is that it was tantamount to the granting of a motion to remit the judgment to a liquidated sum, which does not create an amended judgment. Steuernagel v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. , 238 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Mo. banc 1951); Jenkins v. Roberts , 420 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Mo. App. 1967) (citing and quoting Steuernagel). See also Cotter v. Miller , 54 S.W.3d 691, 694-95 (Mo. App. 2001) . Both operate after a verdict is reached. Cf. Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm'n , 863 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. banc 1993) & section 537.068, RSMo. (1994). Both reduce damages. Cf. sections 537.068 & 537.610, RSMo. (1994). Both are imposed because the damages exceed what the law allows. Functionally, there is no distinction between a verdict that exceeds what the evidence as a matter of law allows and what the law as codified in statute allows. In fact, the Eastern District has described a trial court 's action in capping damages to accord with the limits of Section 537.610.1, as the remitting of a damage award. McGuckin v. City of St. Louis , 910 S.W.2d 842, 844, 844 n.1 (Mo. App. 1995). " he entry after remittitur [i.e, the actual remitting of the judgment] is a correction of the judgment originally entered and not actually a new judgment. The appealable judgment is the original judgment (as corrected of course) but still the appeal is from the original judgment, that is[,] from what remains of it." Steuernagel, 238 S.W.2d at 429. The imposition of the cap established by Section 537.610 did not create an amended judgment. Cf. Hart, 41 S.W.3d at 512 ("In requesting an award of prejudgment interest, however, Appellants are not seeking to amend the September 27th judgments.").
A third reason the November 29th order could not have been a judgment is that the November 29th order was not designated a "judgment." Rule 74.01 ("A judgment is rendered when entered. A judgment is entered when a writing signed by the judge and denominated 'judgment' or 'decree' is filed .") (emphasis added); Koppenaal v. Dir. of Revenue , 987 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Mo. App. 1999).
Treating the August 22nd judgment cum November 29th order as a new, amended judgment would risk creating a policy nightmare. A party could, as the City has done, move to amend the judgment to comply with, say, a statutory cap and then file a motion for a new trial. If the court denied the latter and granted the former in an (aptly denominated) order, the party could then move for the order to be re-branded a " judgment." Then the party could, as the City has done here, make the identical motion for new trial. Alternatively, if the trial court had initially denied the party's post-trial motions in a so-denominated " judgment," the party could turn around and file the exact same motion for new trial, though it would be rather futile to do so (unless one were interested in delaying execution of the judgment or one discovered more evidence to substantiate the motion for new trial). After denying the motion, the process could be repeated ad infinitum.
This may seem to create a quandary for the City. If the N
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