 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Dangerfield v. City of Kansas City6/30/2003
ard and for good cause, vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify" its judgment within that time. Here, thirty days after entry of the original judgment, which occurred on August 22nd, was September 21st. That was when the City filed its first motion for new trial and after that filed its motion to amend the judgment. Thus, even if the first motion for new trial was interlocutory, the trial court lost its power under Rule 75.01 to amend or modify the judgment the very day after the City moved to amend and before the trial granted the motion to reduce the judgment to the statutory cap. Even if the December 10th re-designation of the November 29th order was done within the thirty day window created by Rule 75.01 -- it wasn't -- the Rule requires the court to give the parties "an opportunity to be heard." This was not done: the trial court's December 10th ruling followed an ex parte communication (whether to the judge or to the clerk is immaterial). And, the November 29th order was not a final judgment. See supra.
As noted before, Rule 41.03 compels this court to construe the rules so as to insure a "just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of every action." The analysis above comports with Rule 41.03. There is no injustice in denying the City the opportunity to file two motions for new trial, in light of the fact that no rule (directly) gives a party the right to make two motions for new trial, Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lasker , 12 S.W.3d at 717 , and in light of the fact that the second motion was a verbatim version of the first (as was, essentially, the second set of suggestions). If anything, allowing the City to file two identical motions for new trial merely because of a formalist exercise (namely, re-branding an "order" a "judgment") would create a grave injustice to appellant Dangerfield. Efficiency, moreover, militates against allowing a party to take a second bite at the apple. While collateral estoppel was not raised by Dangerfield, see Walker v. Walker, 954 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Mo. App. 1997) (" party cannot file a motion to modify, asserting the same basis for modification in each motion, and ignore the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in the process."), this court finds that its interpretation and application of the rules of civil procedure upholds one of the doctrine's goals, the preclusion of endless re-litigation of matters already decided.
E. Did the Pendency of the City's Previous Appeal Preclude the Trial Court from Granting the City's Second Motion for New Trial?
Apart from the inapplicability of Rules 75.01, 74.06, and 78.07(c), there is a second reason why the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the City's second motion for new trial (one not raised by either party). Once the City filed a notice of appeal on December 20, 2001 (hours after it filed a motion for new trial), the trial court lost jurisdiction to grant the City's motion. "Although [a trial court] does not lose its jurisdiction over records or of the authority to exercise ministerial or execute functions [ sic ] prior to the filing of the transcript on appeal, the filing of the notice of appeal suspends any further exercise of the [trial court's] judicial function." State ex rel. GTE North, Inc. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n , 835 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Mo. App. 1992) . Whether to vacate a judgment and grant a motion for new trial is a discretionary, not ministerial, decision. Travis v. Stone , 66 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2002) . The City's first appeal was not dismissed until around two months after the trial court had already purported to grant the City's motion for new trial. Accordingly, though dismissal of the appeal re-vested jurisdiction in the trial court, Kuta v. Collier , 637 S.W.2d 7
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Missouri Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|