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[W] Rein v. Benchmark Construction Company6/12/2003
). In regard to foreseeability, the "inquiry is not whether the thing is to be foreseen or anticipated as one which will probably happen, but whether it is likely to happen, even though the likelihood may not be sufficient to amount to a comparative probability." Williams, 185 So. at 236. Further this Court has held that defendants "cannot escape liability because a particular injury could not be foreseen, if some injury ought to have been reasonably anticipated." Delta Elec. Power Ass'n v. Burton, 240 Miss. 209, 126 So. 2d 258, 261 (1961) (emphasis added).
. In McCulloch v. Glasgow, the plaintiff alleged that his heart attack was the result of the City of Ackerman taking his property through eminent domain. McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47, 52 (5th Cir. 1980). The City called his heart attack unforeseeable. Id. The Fifth Circuit stated that the heart attack need not have been foreseeable if the defendant should have foreseen that its action would expose the plaintiff to risk of some otherwise compensable injury . Id.
. This Court has explained the theory of assumption of liability. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 341 So. 2d 665 (Miss. 1977). In Hartford, the operator of a chicken processing plant was insured by Hartford for the cost of repairs and equipment and losses for breakdown of machinery. Id. Under the policy terms, Hartford had a right, but was not required to inspect the equipment and suspend coverage under certain circumstances. Id. While Hartford inspections were made only when a machine was torn down for repairs, Sanderson employed a maintenance superintendent and mechanics to maintain the equipment. Id. An employee suffered an injury and alleged that Hartford should have recognized that inspection was necessary for the protection of third persons. Id. The insurance policy provision giving Hartford the right to make inspections was for the purpose of "reducing risk of loss that Hartford might have under the policy." Id. It did not "rationally give rise to liability for failure to inspect a particular piece of equipment" to the insured's employees. Id. The benefit was held to be incidental. Id. The Court found that Hartford had no reason to know that Sanderson's employees were dependent on the inspections or that they were necessary for their protection. Id. There was no basis for finding that Sanderson was induced by the undertaking to "forego taking precautions against harm to its employees." Id. at 668.
. Finally, under Mississippi law, a third party may maintain an action as a third-party beneficiary to enforce a promise made for their benefit. Burns v. Washington Savs., 251 Miss. 789, 171 So. 2d 322, 324 (1965). However, this right must "spring" from the terms of the contract. Trammell v. State, 622 So. 2d 1257, 1260 (Miss. 1993); Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc. v. Farris, 501 So. 2d 393, 396 (Miss. 1987). Further, a third-party beneficiary may sue for a contract breach only when the alleged broken condition was placed in the contract for their direct benefit. Id. However, an incidental beneficiary requires by virtue of a contract no right against the promisor or promisee. Id. (citing Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Hewes, 190 Miss. 225, 199 So. 93 (1940)).
. In Farris, a high school basketball team was placed on probation and prevented from competing in a tournament. Farris, 501 So. 2d at 393. Team members brought suit against the MHSAA which asked for an injunction to prevent the MHSAA from placing the team on probation. Id. The members alleged that a contract existed that prevented the MHSAA from levying sanctions against the school and team without notice. Id. The team members reasoned that they were third-party
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