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Craig v. Schell3/11/1999
. Perrett (1976), 169 Mont. 167, 174, 545 P.2d 1074, 1079). We did not conclude, as Craig appears to assert, that there are no circumstances in which the sudden appearance of an obstacle in the roadway could render reasonable a driver's subsequent actions in attempting to avoid the obstacle.
. Moreover, we addressed the application of the sudden emergency doctrine again in Eslinger. There, we reiterated the Kudrna principle that the doctrine should not be used in ordinary automobile accident cases and quoted that portion of Kudrna which emphasized that some emergencies must be anticipated and drivers must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles on the highway. Eslinger, 195 Mont. at 299-300, 636 P.2d at 258. We also clarified, however, that a sudden emergency situation is encompassed within the general standard of conduct to be applied in any negligence action--that of a reasonable person under the circumstances as they would appear to one using proper care; the emergency is merely one of the circumstances to be considered. Eslinger, 195 Mont. at 302, 636 P.2d at 260.
. Thus, while Craig correctly asserts that drivers generally must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles in the highway, the question of whether a driver faced with the sudden appearance of such an obstacle reacted appropriately under the circumstances still must be analyzed in terms of the reasonable person negligence standard. As a result, the question in the present case--as the District Court recognized--was whether Moseman acted reasonably under all the circumstances when faced with the sudden appearance of a deer on the road in front of his vehicle. This was clearly a factual question to be answered by the jury.
. I would conclude that the question of whether Moseman acted in a reasonable and prudent manner was properly left to the jury. Thus, on that basis, as well as the Lyndes rule basis, I would affirm the District Court's denial of Craig's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. I Dissent from the Court's failure to do so.
. Finally, because I would affirm the District Court's denial of Craig's summary judgment motion, I would fully address the issue of whether the District Court abused its discretion in granting Craig a new trial on the basis of improper comment by defense counsel in closing arguments. On that issue, I would conclude that defense counsel made three improper comments in closing arguments which prejudiced Craig's right to a fair trial. As a result, I would affirm the District Court's grant of a new trial on all issues.
KARLA M. GRAY
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