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Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales Inc.3/17/1999
ns on certain telephones, it was unclear whether the bank actually had recorded the conversation at issue. We held that the trial Justice erred in granting the bank's motion to exclude any evidence about the possibility of a recording because the defendant was entitled to present to the jury evidence that a recording may have existed before the bank destroyed it, pursuant to the doctrine omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatiorem ("all things are presumed against a despoiler"). 674 A.2d at 1234. Under this doctrine, the deliberate or negligent destruction of relevant evidence by a party to litigation may give rise to an inference that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliating party. A showing of bad faith on the part of the despoiler is not necessary to permit the spoliation inference, even though it may strengthen the inference. See id.
Here, the Farrells clearly were aware of the potential relevance of the motor home to their dispute with defendants when they took steps to refuse Fleetwood's requests to take possession of the vehicle for inspection and repair purposes, and when they subsequently allowed the bank to repossess the motor home. However, while Eastern General is instructive, it does not address the situation presented in the case at bar, in which the trial Justice went beyond instructing the jury about drawing an adverse inference from the motor home's unavailability and ruled that the Farrells' disposal of the central piece of evidence barred their introduction of all other evidence of the vehicle's condition after Connetti had performed repair work.
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the inherent authority of a trial court to bar all evidence relating to an expert's opinion, or even to a party's case-in-chief, based on that party's destruction of critical evidence. See Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994); Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263, 267-69 (8th Cir. 1993); Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 118-19 (Minn. 1995); Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Centers, 544 N.W.2d 122, 124-27 (N.D. 1996). In fact, some courts have held that when a plaintiff's loss or destruction of an allegedly defective product before trial deprives a defendant of the most direct means of countering the allegations, then dismissal of the plaintiff's case, see Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), or the entry of summary judgment for the defendant, see Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Products, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1992), may be appropriate. See generally Phoebe L. McGlynn, Spoliation in the Product Liability Context, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 663 (1997) (discussing various court-imposed sanctions when a party spoliates evidence). Other courts have used five factors in determining an appropriate sanction for the spoliation of relevant evidence: "`(1) whether the defendant was prejudiced * * *; (2) whether the prejudice can be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the [despoiler acted] in good faith or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if the evidence is not excluded.'" Northern Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281, 282-83 (D. Me. 1993) (quoting Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 365 (D. Mass. 1991)). The trial Justice in the case at bar appropriately considered these five factors before concluding that they warranted exclusion of the Farrells' evidence concerning the motor home's condition.
We are of the opinion, however, that under the circumstances of this case, the trial Justice went too far, and thereby abused his discretion, in selecting a suitable remedy for the Farrells' spoliation of the motor home. Here, he decided to impose the following s
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