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Skene v. Beland6/10/2003
The plaintiff, James Skene (plaintiff), appeals a Superior Court justice's exclusion of expert testimony, denial of a motion to pass, and refusal to grant a new trial in this personal injury action. This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on May 12, 2003, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. Having reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, and having considered the oral arguments, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and proceed to decide the appeal at this time. For the reasons indicated below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I. Facts and Travel
On November 23, 1994, plaintiff and defendant, Richard Beland (defendant), were involved in an automobile accident. The details about exactly how the accident occurred are disputed. At trial, plaintiff testified that he was traveling on Route 6 in Providence when defendant entered his lane of travel and struck his car. The defendant, however, testified that plaintiff was driving erratically and struck the side of his car. The plaintiff called William Howerton (Howerton), an engineer and an accident reconstructionist, to provide expert testimony to support his case. When plaintiff's counsel asked Howerton whether he could explain to a "reasonable degree of engineering certainty, as to how this accident probably happened," Howerton responded, " n a limited sense, yes." This sparked a flurry of objections, brief jury excusals and bench conferences as the trial justice struggled to determine the admissibility of Howerton's proposed testimony.
Howerton explained that, in his opinion, there must have been an "earlier interaction" between the vehicles that caused "both operators to take some sort of evasive action," which ultimately caused the accident. After the trial justice questioned Howerton out of the jury's presence about whether he had an opinion to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty what the earlier interaction was, Howerton responded "I don't know. * * * All I know is [that] it had to happen * * *." There was no evidence to support Howerton's "earlier interaction" theory. Based on this uncertainty, the trial justice, believing this testimony was confusing, excluded Howerton's testimony about the purported "earlier interaction." The trial justice found that, under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the testimony lacked sufficient probative value to outweigh the confusion.
Once Howerton's testimony in front of the jury resumed, he again referred to the "earlier interaction," which prompted another objection. The trial justice called the attorneys to the bench and encouraged the jury to talk among themselves instead of excusing them during the sidebar. At sidebar, the trial justice again stated that she would not allow Howerton to speculate about the nature of an "earlier interaction" without any supporting evidence. The trial justice sustained the objection.
Finally, during cross-examination, Howerton again referred to the theoretical "interaction." Defense counsel moved to strike the testimony and plaintiff's counsel objected. Once more, the trial justice excused the jury. Howerton had another opportunity to explain to the trial justice his theory about the "interaction," but failed to clarify the confusion. The trial justice refused to allow the jury to hear Howerton's testimony about the "interaction" because it "was likely to confuse [them] and prejudice the defendant, without having a significant probative value."
Subsequently, plaintiff moved to pass the case because, he argued, the trial justice berated Howert
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