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Sulzen v. Williams3/11/1999
first and second actions individually and on behalf of Brandon Holton, a minor. Under section 78-12-36 of the Utah Code,
" f a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1996).
The Sulzens contend that this provision tolls the statute of limitations for a minor's claim during his or her minority regardless of whether the minor has a legal guardian. In other words, the Sulzens claim that section 78-12-36's "without a legal guardian" restriction applies only to mentally incompetent individuals, and not to minors. Accordingly, the Sulzens argue, section 78-12-36 tolled the statute of limitations for Brandon's wrongful death claim even though legal guardians had been appointed on his behalf.
In contrast, Jepson insists that, under the 1987 amendments to section 78-12-36, both minors and mentally incompetent individuals must be "without a legal guardian" for the statute to apply. In other words, Jepson claims that "without a legal guardian" is a restriction applying both to individuals who are "mentally incompetent," and to those who are "under the age of majority." Consequently, Jepson contends, section 78-12-36 did not toll the statute of limitations for Brandon's wrongful death claim because Brandon had legal guardians during the limitations period.
Grammatically, both Jepson's and the Sulzens' constructions of section 78-12-36 are plausible. Under a plain reading of the provision, the "without a legal guardian" restriction could apply only to mentally incompetent individuals, or to both mentally incompetent individuals and minors. The provision's punctuation, or lack thereof, renders it capable of both meanings. Hence, section 78-12-36 is ambiguous because it "can reasonably be understood to have more than one meaning." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). Consequently, we "seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations" to divine section 78-12-36's meaning and application. In Re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996).
Before 1987, section 78-12-36 provided:
"If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either:"
"(1) Under the age of majority; or,"
"(2) Mentally incompetent and without legal guardian; or,"
"(3) Imprisoned . . . [,]"
" he time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1977).
With the objective of "removing imprisonment as a legal disability tolling the statute of limitation," the Legislature amended section 78-12-36 in 1987, removing certain language and making stylistic changes. 1987 Utah Laws ch. 19, § 5. Specifically, the Legislature removed prisoners from the provision's scope and deleted the provision's numbering scheme, since it now dealt with only two categories instead of three. See id.
Under Jepson's construction of section 78-12-36, in addition to removing imprisonment as a legal disability for tolling purposes, as it said it intended, the Legislature in 1987 also meant, without an equivalent declaration of intent, to substantially limit the benefit to minors of the statute's tolling provision. Based on the provision's legislative history, this is an incorrect reading of section 78-12-36. Before 1987, there was no question that "wi
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