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Sulzen v. Williams3/11/1999
thout a legal guardian" did not modify section 78-12-36's tolling provision for minors. The Legislature's only expressed purpose for the 1987 amendments was "removing imprisonment as a legal disability tolling the statute of limitation." 1987 Utah Laws ch. 19, § 5. This legislative history in no way supports Jepson's contention that the amendments had the intended effect of removing the statute's tolling protection for minors. Rather, the legislative history shows that the Sulzens' reading of section 78-12-36 is the correct interpretation.
In other words, notwithstanding the Legislature's 1987 amendments, the listing of individuals to whom section 78-12-36 applies should still be read in the disjunctive. Hence, as in its previous codifications, section 78-12-36 applies as follows:
"If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1996).
Simply stated, while mentally incompetent individuals have to be without a legal guardian to fit within section 78-12-36's scope, minors do not.
In addition to comporting with the provision's legislative history, this reading of section 78-12-36 is in harmony with the policies underlying the provision. Section 78-12-36 "was obviously intended to prevent a person from losing the opportunity to bring a claim where circumstances precluded either proper notice or a realistic effort to pursue the claim." Johnson v. State, 945 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1997). This concern is especially present in section 78-12-36's application to minors. See generally Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 578-79 (Utah 1993) (describing various protections of minors' interests given their legal incapacity); Scott v. School Board, 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 1977) (same). If, as Jepson asserts, the 1987 amendments removed section 78-12-36's tolling effect for minors with guardians, circumstances could, and likely would, hinder such minors' proper notice of, or realistic opportunity to pursue, legal claims. See Gaufin, 867 P.2d at 578 (noting "parents and guardians fail to assert a minor's claim because they are neglectful, unavailable, or disinterested, or because they have a conflict of interest in filing a lawsuit for the minor"). Consequently, such children could lose their opportunity to bring valid legal claims, eviscerating section 78-12-36's "obvious inten ." Johnson, 945 P.2d at 674.
To prevent such a dilemma, Utah courts refuse to recognize exceptions to the minority/tolling rule absent an express, unequivocal, and exacting legislative mandate. See, e.g., Cole v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 899 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1995) (" e are unconvinced that the legislature would dramatically depart from its general intent to protect the causes of minors without a more definite statement as to its intent to remove the protection provided by the general tolling provision of section 78-12-36."); Blum v. Stone, 752 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah 1988) ("The sweeping scope of [Utah case law] requires that all statutes of limitation be tolled during minority unless the legislature enacts a specific exemption."). See also Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah 1980) (ruling that, because wrongful death "cause of action is a personal property right of the heir, [the wrongful death] limitation period is tolled during the period of a minor heir's disability").
Accordingly, because Brandon Holton was a minor when his cause of action accrued, the two-year limitation set forth i
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