Craftsman Builder's Supply Inc. v. Butler Manufacturing Co.3/5/1999
ourts recognize that lawmakers cannot deprive plaintiffs of vested rights. Further, no court has taken an absolute approach at the other end of the spectrum, holding that the remedy guarantee prohibits any and all legislative elimination or modification of remedies. That approach would work radical changes on well settled doctrines such as statutes of limitations, workers' compensation, and sovereign immunity. Most courts find some middle ground: they interpret the remedy guarantee to proscribe some legislation affecting remedies without completely constraining lawmakers." 65 Temp. L. Rev. at 1208 (emphasis added). For cases that either expressly or implicitly recognize the restrictive effect of the remedy clause on arbitrary legislative action, see, for example, Kruszewski v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 653 So. 2d 935, 937-38 (Ala. 1995), Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1000-04 (Ala. 1982), Hayes v. Continental Insurance Co., 872 P.2d 668, 676 (Ariz. 1994), Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 861 P.2d 625, 627 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc), White v. City of Newport, 933 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Ark. 1996), Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 751 & n.31 (Conn. 1995), Young v. O.A. Newton & Son Co., 477 A.2d 1071, 1078 (Del. Super. 1984), Gallegher v. Davis, 183 A. 620, 624-25 (Del. Super. 1936), Agency for Health Care Administration v. Associated Industries of Florida, Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1253 (Fla. 1996), Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1171 (Fla. 1991), Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973), Lemuz v. Fieser, 933 P.2d 134, 141-44 (Kan. 1997), Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973), Walden v. Housing Authority, 854 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991), Nutbrown v. Mount Cranmore, Inc., 671 A.2d 548, 550 (N.H. 1996), Brennaman v. RMI Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994), Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 609 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ohio 1993), Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1987), Griest v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789 (Or. 1995), Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984), Daugaard v. Baltic Co-Operative Building Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419, 424 (S.D. 1984), Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996), Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664-65 (Tex. 1983), and Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 634, 645 (W. Va. 1991).
The Framers of the Utah Constitution, in adopting Article I, section 11, intended to establish a fundamental principle to a just civil society. Unless the law provides remedies "by due course of law" for vindication of wrongs inflicted on persons, their property, or their reputations, a civil society cannot exist, as Lord Coke and Sir William Blackstone long ago observed. The Framers clearly recognized that a peaceful and just society must provide civil remedies for the protection of fundamental personal interests so that people can protect the integrity of their persons from injuries inflicted by others, their property rights from interference and misappropriation by others, and their good character from libel and slander. In addition, section 11 serves the important goal of buttressing the independence of the judiciary against improper interference by other branches of government. In sum, section 11, at bottom, seeks to secure a basic principle of Justice that will, in the end, deter persons wronged by others from resorting to self-help and the inevitable violence that ensues when people take the law into their own hands rather than seeking judicial remedies.
IV. BERRY DOES NOT IMPROPERLY INTERFERE WITH THE LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVES AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTIONALIZE THE COMMON LAW, AND SECTION 11 RIGHTS ARE NOT DETERMINED BY THE COMMON LAW AS IT EXISTED IN 1896
Justice Zimmerman contends that Berry constit
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