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Watson v. Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Phoenix2/13/2003
ve been awakened and that there would have been some residual physical evidence of the act. Watson's expert psychologist, Dr. Brown, interviewed and tested Watson extensively but offered no opinion that Watson's memory of the contact with Bredemann remained partially repressed. As the trial court noted, Watson had not recovered any such memory, despite months of therapy and years (over five) since recollecting the events. Dr. Brown agreed that there was no evidence of threats, pain, violence, or penetration--apart from Watson's remembered pain--and he testified that the trauma of Watson's encounter with Bredemann "wasn't that severe."
The weight to be afforded to the evidence was for the trial court. We are unable to say that the trial court's finding of minimal, non-violent contact between Watson and Bredemann was not a reasonable conclusion from the evidence, and we must therefore uphold it.
Evidence of Dissociation and Betrayal Trauma
Watson argues that the trial court failed to consider a predictor of repressed memory described as "dissociation and betrayal trauma" and contends that the trial court rejected "uncontradicted and compelling evidence" that Watson fit this profile for repressed memory. As Watson sees it, the trial court's finding that he did not suffer from dissociative amnesia was based on either a misunderstanding of the evidence or a decision not to accept the opinion of Watson's expert. Watson argues that, because the trial court accepted for purposes of its analysis that the phenomenon of dissociative amnesia exists, it was obliged to accept the testimony of Watson's expert that Watson suffered from that condition.
To begin with, this argument is a non sequitur. Accepting that some individuals have experienced dissociative amnesia does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that a particular victim, Watson in this case, experienced it. Watson does not allege trial court error in excluding evidence on this issue but instead argues that, because only Dr. Brown had assessed Watson clinically and Dr. Brown believed Watson suffered from dissociative amnesia, "the Court's decision to ignore [this evidence] was clearly erroneous."
Watson is asking, in essence, for us to hold that the trial court was required as a matter of law to accept Watson's expert's testimony, but that is something we are not free to do. See, e.g., State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 97, 692 P.2d 272, 276 (1984) (the credibility of and weight to be given expert medical testimony are issues of fact for jury). A trier of fact may accept or reject expert testimony and give it the weight, if any, deemed appropriate. State v. Bishop, 162 Ariz. 103, 107, 781 P.2d 581, 585 (1989). A trial judge "may rely on particular views of one or more experts even though he or she may disagree with the expert's ultimate conclusion." Id.; see also State v. Cano, 103 Ariz. 37, 41-42, 436 P.2d 586, 590-91 (1968) (expert testimony regarding sanity is merely evidence for the trier of fact to consider and weigh). "The trial judge may rely on some testimony from one expert and other testimony from another expert and draw his [or her] own conclusions." Bishop, 162 Ariz. at 107, 781 P.2d at 585. Even a lack of controverting evidence does not prevent the trial judge from giving an expert's opinion any weight deemed proper, or no weight. Crystal Bottled Waters v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 174 Ariz. 184, 185-86, 847 P.2d 1131, 1132-33 (App. 1993) (expert evidence of suitability and availability of employment for claimant is not conclusive).
Moreover, Dr. Brown's testimony was not as unequivocal as Watson characterizes it. Dr. Brown acknowledged studies showing that the best predictors f
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