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Smith v. Mobil Oil Corporation2/21/2003
ot asked to accept opposing counsel's representation as to this amount "on faith," as it contends, but rather on the basis of a sworn declaration evidencing personal knowledge of the facts asserted. In the context of a motion proceeding, such a declaration constitutes admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., ยงยง 2009, 2015.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 323.) Given the manner in which the case law dictates that settlement credits are to be computed (see discussion infra), it is difficult to see what information about the terms of the settlements, other than the total amount of the settlement proceeds, would be relevant to that issue. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that a right to discovery in this context might exist in a proper case, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying it on this record.
As to the trial court's decision on the calculation of settlement credits, it is a pure question of law which we review de novo. Mobil acknowledges that the trial court's calculation applied the now well-established formula set forth in Espinoza v. Machonga (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 268, but argues that this formula "is neither logically sound, nor compelled by Proposition 51."
Specifically, Mobil argues that Espinoza's "methodology confuses the concept of a defendant's proportionate liability for non-economic damages, with the separate right of setoff of settlement credits against that proportionate liability." Thus, Mobil contends that its liability for its proportionate share of non-economic damages should be calculated by applying its percentage of fault not to the entire amount of the non-economic (and loss of consortium) damages, but only to the portion of those damages that remains after a settlement credit for non-economic damages (calculated according to the Espinoza method) is subtracted.
Mobil cites no authority for this acknowledged novel argument. Mobil argues that the failure to credit the non-economic damages portion of prior settlements before applying the non-settling defendant's proportion of fault "results in a pure windfall to the plaintiff." A similar argument was rejected in Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 48, 65-68, for reasons we find equally persuasive here.
More importantly, the result urged by Mobil appears to be flatly contradictory to the plain language of Civil Code section 1431.2, subdivision (a), which requires that "Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault . . . ." (Italics added.) To adopt Mobil's formula would result in each non-settling defendant's portion of non-economic damages being allocated not in direct, but in indirect proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault. Based on the language of Civil Code section 1431.1, and the analysis of the issue expounded in Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Systems (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 221, 234-237, we decline to depart from the line of cases that have applied the Espinoza formula, and reject Mobil's suggested modification thereof.
IV. Disposition
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Kline, P.J.
Lambden, J.
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