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Scheiding v. General Motors Corp.8/3/1998
no intent to interfere with prevalent state tort remedies and upon comprehensive FDA regulations narrowly interpreting the scope of the MDA's preemptive effect and evincing an "overarching concern that pre-emption occur only where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest." (Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 500.)
English defined the field which the Atomic Energy Act occupied as that of "radiological safety." (English, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 82, 85.) In Silkwood, the court found no congressional intent to preempt punitive damages actions for conduct relating to radiation hazards. The court was greatly influenced by the Price-Anderson Act, enacted in 1957, which evidenced a congressional intent that state court remedies would not be affected by AEC regulations. (Id. at pp. 251-255.) The court was also influenced by Congress' failure to provide any alternate federal remedy for persons injured by exposure to hazardous nuclear materials. (Id. at p. 251.) In both Medtronic and Silkwood, the Supreme Court did not believe Congress would, without comment, supplant existing state tort remedies, leaving victims no remedy. (Silkwood, at p. 251; Medtronic, at p. 487.)
In contrast to the statutory schemes under scrutiny in Silkwood and Medtronic, there was no tort remedy extant at the time the BIA was enacted. (See Discussion, infra, at p. 19) Further, Congress here has provided a remedy for injured employees in the form of the FELA, leading to an inference that Congress intended to supplant other remedies which might in future be enacted by state law. As Viad recognized, the primary aim behind both the BIA and the FELA was safety. (Viad, at p. 337.) The FELA was originally crafted to shift "`part of the "`human overhead'" of doing business from employees to their employers. [Citations.]'" (id. at p. 337) and that it since has been "construed liberally to further Congress's remedial and humanitarian goal. [Citations.] One of the primary purposes of FELA was to eliminate defenses to tort liability and to facilitate recovery. [Citation.]" (Id., at p. 338.) The remedies provided for violations of the BIA were in many respects more "worker friendly" than traditional tort remedies. For example, under the FELA, violations of the BIA which result in injuries are negligent per se. (Fryer v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. (1933) 333 Mo. 740, 63 S.W.2d 47.) The FELA statutorily established a right to sue for wrongful death where such a claim was not recognized by common law. (St. Louis, I. Mtn. & S. Ry. Co. v. Hesterly (1913) 228 U.S. 702.) Negligence of the employee was not a bar to recovery, but only reduced the amount of damages proportionately. Where the injury or death resulted from violations of the BIA or the Safety Appliance Act, even comparative fault was not a defense. (45 U.S.C. ยง 53.)
Moreover, we believe Viad draws the wrong Conclusion from the absence of state tort remedies against manufacturers at the time the BIA was enacted. As Viad describes, in Silkwood and Medtronic the Supreme Court discerned a congressional assumption that tort remedies would be available, based upon the existence of state tort remedies at the time the relevant legislation was enacted and the absence of any discernible legislative intent to eliminate those existing state law remedies. In contrast, when the BIA was enacted there existed no private right of action against a manufacturer. That right was established when the privity doctrine was repudiated in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N.Y. 382 [111 N.E. 1050], decided after enactment of the BIA, but 10 years before Napier. Strict liability of a manufacturer was not established until much later in the 1960's. (Vi
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