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Calatayud v. State8/6/1998
e exceptional circumstances in which we ignore the literal language of a statute in order to give effect to its manifest legislative purpose, when there is a strong indication that a literal interpretation would be contrary to that purpose. (See, e.g., People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898.) But nothing about the context or legislative history of section 1714.9(a) convinces me that construing "any person" literally to include peace officers from other agencies is at odds with the basic purposes of the statute. On the contrary, it is quite consistent with that purpose.
As the majority rightly point out, section 1714.9(a) is substantially based on " `the rationale expressed by Justice Tobriner in his Dissent' " in Hubbard v. Boelt (1980) 28 Cal.3d 480, 487-493 (Hubbard). (Maj. opn., ante, p. 11.) In that case the majority held that a police officer injured in a high-speed chase of a reckless traffic offender was barred by the firefighter's rule from suing that person. The Dissent was not a narrow, fact specific, opinion, but rather a broad and general attack on the Hubbard majority's extension of the firefighter rule beyond its traditional narrow confines. As Justice Tobriner stated: "the majority's policy formulation in this case has fundamentally altered the limited nature of the traditional fireman's rule, converting the rule into a broad doctrine prohibiting firemen and police officers - but no other employees - from recovering for injuries which they suffer at the hands of third persons in the course of their employment. This reasoning is not only inconsistent with the traditional limits of the fireman's rule, but in addition squarely conflicts with the principles of Labor Code section 3852, which provides that `the claim to the employee for [workers'] compensation does not effect its claim or right of action for all damages proximately resulting from such injury or death against any person other than the employer.' " (28 Cal.3d at p. 491 (dis. opn. of Tobriner, J.), italics in Justice Tobriner's opinion.)
As Justice Tobriner further stated: "the policy basis for the traditional firemen's rule rests on the notion that ordinary tax-paying members of the public hire firemen and police officers at least in part to deal with future dangers that may in the normal course of events result from the taxpayer's own negligence, and that - by analogy to insurance, for example - it is unfair and unduly burdensome subsequently to require an unfortunate, if negligent, individual taxpayer to pay again for injuries sustained when such negligence in fact occurs." (28 Cal.3d at p. 492 (dis. opn. of Tobriner, J.).) In order to confine the firefighter's rule to boundaries commensurate with this original rationale, Justice Tobriner proposed three broad limitations on the rule: it should not prevent recovery when a person commits subsequent negligent acts after the police officer arrives on the scene, nor when a person intentionally or wantonly injures such officers, nor when a person violates a statute and the officer suffering the injury was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted. (Id. at pp. 488-490.) Section 1714.9(a) incorporates each of these three limitations on the firefighter's rule.
The majority state, after reviewing the Hubbard Dissent and related legislative history, that "we find no evidence the Legislature used the phrase `any person' to encompass other jointly involved public safety members or to extend the scope of section 1714.9 (a)(1) to injury caused by them. Viewed in context, the provision demonstrates singular concern with the prototypical case in which the firefighter's rule is invoked to shield a defendant whose original misconduct occasioned
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