 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Calatayud v. State8/6/1998
words, the most reasonable assumption is that section 1714.9, subdivision (d) incorporates general workers' compensation principles into suits by police officers and firefighters, and that therefore police officers or other government employees cannot sue government employees employed by the same agency, but can sue government employees from other agencies to the extent permitted by the Workers' Compensation Act.
Apart from questions of statutory construction, the majority make a number of policy arguments why its interpretation of section 1714(a) is sound. Aside from the fact that this court's conception of sound public policy should not displace that of the Legislature, I find these policy arguments unconvincing.
The majority state: "Sound policy mandates that the discharge of [police officers'] duties [to protect the public] takes precedence over avoiding injury to fellow officers, particularly when responding to a rapidly developing emergency or crisis." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.) That is no doubt the case, and police officers' activity would be protected to some degree by governmental immunities of various types. Also, this sound policy mandate would shape the factfinder's determination of whether a peace officer acted reasonably under the circumstances. But what happens when, as the jury apparently found in this case, the peace officer was negligent not in the sense that he failed to protect the other peace officer from harm, but rather that he failed to follow reasonable police procedures - that is, those designed to protect the public - in attempting to apprehend a suspect with one hand while holding a rifle with the other? In such cases, the interest in protecting the public and in allowing police officers to be fairly compensated through the tort system for their injuries are not in conflict. In other words, there is no reason to assume that enforcing a rule of compensation for injurious conduct by fellow police officers will be at odds with the goal of public safety. Moreover, given the strong moral and practical disincentives for police officers not to harm fellow police officers, it is highly doubtful that the abstract threat of (usually indemnifiable) liability will significantly further inhibit a police officer from acting vigorously and appropriately in an emergency situation.
The majority cite the "costs-spreading rationale" as another reason for supporting its position, quoting language in Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 532, 543: " ` o permit firefighters to bring actions for injury caused by responding to a fire would involve the parties in costly litigation over rights of subrogation without substantially benefiting the firefighter, who is compensated either by the retirement system or the workers' compensation system.'. . . Applying the firefighter's rule thus `relieve public agencies of the burden of lawsuits over rights of subrogation that are pointless because the public fisc ultimately pays regardless of the outcome . . . .' " (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.) The above quoted language is taken from a context in which we were concerned with demonstrating that the firefighter's rule should not be extended to private firefighters. But, as used by the majority, this statement proves too much. It is an argument for the extension of the firefighter's rule to bar all lawsuits by all public employees. The argument has no special force with respect to police officers suing other police officers. From a public employee's standpoint, a private right of action is frequently advantageous because the tort system may compensate him to a greater extent than the disability or retirement system. The Legislature, having obviously considered this cost spread
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 California Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|