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Calatayud v. State8/6/1998
ing, efficiency argument as reason not to restrict the firefighter's rule, nonetheless enacted section 1714.9(a) and allowed firefighters and peace officers to maintain private rights of action under the circumstances enumerated in the statute. It is not for us to question this legislative judgment.
The majority also contend that we should not consider "any person" to include fellow peace officers because such a construction would have an "adverse effects on the fisc." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.) But is this really the case? California courts have long assumed that police officers could sue other police officers. (See Rose v. City of Los Angeles (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 883.) As far as I can discern, there has been no substantial impact on the public treasury as a result, and the majority demonstrate none beyond their bald assertion. There is indeed every reason to believe that, in light of the skill and training of our peace officers, such lawsuits are relatively rare events. It is therefore unsurprising that, as the majority point out, many public agencies supported the passage of section 1714.9(a): A public agency would have far more to gain, in terms of recovering workers' compensation costs through subrogation of an injured officer's personal injury award, as is permitted by section 1714.9, subdivision (c), than it would have to lose in the rare event that one of its officers injured an officer from another agency.
In short, the language and purpose of section 1714.9(a) lead me to conclude that "any person" should be taken literally, and that there is no implied exemption for peace officers or any other occupational classification. In the final analysis, the real policy question is this: Do the benefits of permitting a police officer to sue an officer from a different agency who has injured him - including the benefits that accrue directly to the police officer - outweigh the harm such suits may cause, financially and otherwise, sufficient to create an exemption from liability under section 1714.9(a)? This is a question that the Legislature is far better equipped than this court to address, for it is better able to measure the magnitude of the various harms and benefits. Our task is simply to give effect to the language and purpose of the statute, and that should lead us to affirm the Court of Appeal's holding that plaintiff in this case has a right of action against the State of California and a California Highway Patrol officer. The Legislature can easily amend the statute if its own public policy assessment so dictates.
[Editor's note: originally released as an unpublished opinion] Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted XXX 55 Cal.App.4th 295 Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S062627 Date Filed: August 6, 1998
Court: Superior County: Los Angeles Judge: Robert M. Olson
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