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Calatayud v. State8/6/1998
the public to insure against the injuries that its officers will inevitably sustain in the performance of their duties." (Comment, supra, at p. 235; see Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at p. 360.)
Additionally, the firefighter's rule serves the policy of efficient judicial administration by eliminating claims that would simply "burden our courts with litigation among the employer public agency, the retirement system, and the negligence insurer. Whether the employee is ultimately compensated with money derived from taxes or from insurance, the public pays the bill." (Walters, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 206; Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 543.) Complex determinations of causation would also present "difficult problems requiring lengthy trials." (Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at p. 360; Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 543; cf. Scott v. E.L. Yeager Constr. Co. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1190, 1195-1196.)
Like most legal principles, the firefighter's rule is not without its exceptions. "The firefighter does not assume every risk of his or her occupation. [Citation.] The rule does not apply to conduct other than that which necessitated the summoning of the firefighter or police officer, and it does not apply to independent acts of misconduct that are committed after the firefighter or police officer has arrived on the scene. [Citations.]" (Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 538; see also Krauth v. Geller, supra, 157 A.2d at pp. 131-132.) "In Walters, the majority [also] recognized that the fireman's rule does not preclude recovery when the defendant has violated a statute and the officer ` "suffering . . . the injury . . . was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was adopted." ' (20 Cal.3d at pp. 206-207, quoting Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a)(4).)" (Hubbard, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 490 (dis. opn. of Tobriner, J.).)
Until 1982, the firefighter's rule developed as part of the common law. In that year, the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 1714.9, codifying certain exceptions. (Stats. 1982, ch. 258, § 1, p. 836.) Subdivision (a)(1) of Civil Code section 1714.9, at issue here, provides that " otwithstanding statutory or decisional law to the contrary, any person is responsible not only for the results of that person's willful acts causing injury to a peace officer, firefighter, or any emergency medical personnel employed by a public entity, but also for any injury occasioned to that person by the want of ordinary care or skill in the management of the person's property or person, in any of the following situations: [ ] (1) Where the conduct causing the injury occurs after the person knows or should have known of the presence of the peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical personnel."
The question on these facts is whether "any person" as used in Civil Code section 1714.9, subdivision (a)(1) includes public safety members employed by a different agency. The Court of Appeal applied this language literally and concluded it does; plaintiff essentially adopts this analysis. Defendants argue the Legislature never intended the provision to apply to other safety personnel; nor did it contemplate the statute would displace the firefighter's rule in those situations. After due consideration of the statutory scheme in light of its legislative history, as well as the policy implications, we find defendants' argument more persuasive.
"The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. [Citations
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