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City of Moorpark v. Superior Court of Ventura County8/17/1998
term "discrimination" only in the pejorative sense to refer to arbitrary judgments about individuals based on group stereotypes. (Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 896.)
Disability sometimes impacts a person's ability to perform a particular job , in which case the employer may treat a disabled employee differently than a nondisabled employee. Nevertheless, if disabled employees can prove that they can perform the job duties as effectively as nondisabled employees, taking into consideration the possibility, if any, that their condition will change, as well as the employer's short and long-term needs, then we think discrimination based on disability, like sex and age discrimination, violates a "substantial and fundamental" public policy and can form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim. Nevertheless, this remedy must be "carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated" in the FEHA on which it is based. (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) Accordingly, just as disability discrimination in violation of section 132a does not alone establish a valid FEHA claim, it also does not alone establish a valid common law wrongful discharge claim. Furthermore, to the extent section 132a, the FEHA, and the common law remedies overlap, equitable principles preclude multiple recoveries for the same injury .
We conclude that disability discrimination can form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim. Because section 132a does not provide the exclusive remedy for discrimination based on a work-related disability, the trial court was correct to overrule the demurrer to Dillon's common law wrongful discharge cause of action.
3. Dillon's intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.
We held in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 160, that the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law preclude a civil claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the employer's actions giving rise to the claim were "a normal part of the employment relationship." The Court of Appeal did not decide whether Cole applies here, and defendants did not raise this issue in their petition for review. Accordingly, we also do not reach the issue. Conclusion
Section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy precluding FEHA and common law wrongful discharge claims. In addition, disability discrimination can form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim. Accordingly, the trial court was correct to overrule defendants' demurrer to Dillon's FEHA and common law wrongful discharge claims, and the Court of Appeal was correct to deny defendants' petition for a writ of mandate. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J. MOSK, J. KENNARD, J. WERDEGAR, J.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY BROWN, j.
I concur in the majority's Conclusion that plaintiff Theresa L. Dillon may pursue a disability discrimination claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). I respectfully Dissent from the majority's Conclusion that Dillon can also maintain a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. (See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 (Tameny).)
I.
The Legislature clearly envisioned at least some circumstances in which workers injured on the job could pursue both workers' compensation remedies and remedies under FEHA and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.). In 1993, the Legislature amended Labor Code section 139.6, part of the workers' compensa
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