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City of Moorpark v. Superior Court of Ventura County8/17/1998
hat apply to other workers' compensation remedies. (See Lab. Code, ยงยง 3600, 3602, subd. (a).) But section 132a is quite different from other workers' compensation remedies. Most workers' compensation remedies compensate an employee for a medical injury. Section 132a, however, addresses a breach of an employee's civil rights and applies regardless of whether that breach causes a medical injury. Because of this distinction, we see no compelling reason to treat section 132a like other workers' compensation remedies.
Moreover, the existence of a workers' compensation remedy does not by itself establish that the remedy is exclusive. Rather, the scope of workers' compensation exclusivity depends on the terms of the exclusive remedy provisions. Section 132a does not itself contain an exclusive remedy clause, and, as explained below, the general exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law expressly do not apply to section 132a.
Labor Code section 3600, subdivision (a), provides: "Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever . . . , shall . . . exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course of the employment . . . ." (Italics added.) When section 3600 refers to "this division," it refers to division 4 of the Labor Code. Section 132a, on the other hand, is in division 1 of the Labor Code. Similarly, Labor Code section 3602, subdivision (a), provides: "Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation is . . . the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee . . . ." (Italics added.) Labor Code section 3207 defines " ` ompensation' " as "compensation under Division 4 . . . includ every benefit or payment conferred by Division 4 upon an injured employee . . . ." Again, section 132a is in division 1 of the Labor Code, not division 4. Thus, the plain language of the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law apparently limits those provisions to division 4 remedies. Remedies that the Legislature placed in other divisions of the Labor Code are simply not subject to the workers' compensation exclusive remedy provisions.
The Portillo court also relied on the "compensation bargain" underlying the workers' compensation law, whereby " he Workers' Compensation Act . . . afford workers quick determination of their claims" but "limit the employee to . . . a single forum, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board." (Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 287.) The court reasoned that this same "compensation bargain" applied implicitly to section 132a. In other words, section 132a affords workers an inexpensive and quick remedy for discrimination based on a work-related disability, but that remedy is exclusive. (Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 287-288.)
Again, the Portillo court erred. Though the compensation bargain, and in particular the exclusive remedy principle, applies to most workers' compensation proceedings, we recognized in Shoemaker and Gantt that certain employer conduct falls outside the compensation bargain. Specifically, we held in Shoemaker that an injury resulting from a wrongful termination in violation of a whistleblower protection statute "lies well outside the compensation bargain," and the exclusive remedy provisions do not apply. (Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 23.) In Gantt, we reaffirmed Shoemaker and extended its holding to a case involving a common law wrongful discharge cause of action. We concluded that "the . . . `compensation bargain' cannot encompass conduct, such as sexual or racial discrimination, `obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrar
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