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City of Moorpark v. Superior Court of Ventura County8/17/1998
isions of the FEHA and our decisions interpreting it further support our Conclusion that section 132a is not exclusive. The FEHA broadly announces "the public policy of this state that it is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of . . . physical disability mental disability . . . ." (Gov. Code, § 12920.) The FEHA further provides that " t shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . [ ] . . . or an employer, because of the . . . physical disability mental disability . . . of any person, to . . . discriminate against the person . . . ." (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) Nothing in these provisions suggests that the FEHA only applies to physical or mental disabilities that are unrelated to work. Moreover, the FEHA declares that its "provisions . . . shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof." (Gov. Code, § 12993, subd. (a).) A construction of section 12940, subdivision (a), that narrows the term "disability" to disabilities unrelated to work seems inconsistent with the principle of liberal construction.
Furthermore, our decisions have consistently emphasized the breadth of the FEHA. In State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 422, we considered whether the FEHA covered state civil service employees despite similar antidiscrimination provisions in the Civil Service Act. (See Gov. Code, § 19702, subd. (a).) We concluded that " he FEHA was meant to supplement, not . . . be supplanted by, existing antidiscrimination remedies, in order to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate their civil rights against discrimination . . . ." (State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 431, italics added.) Similarly, in Rojo, we considered whether victims of sex discrimination could bring common law wrongful discharge claims in addition to FEHA claims. We concluded that the Legislature intended the FEHA "to amplify" (Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 75) other remedies and "to expand" (id. at p. 80) the rights of persons who are victims of employment discrimination. (See also Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 135 [The Legislature intended "to create new rights within the FEHA statutory scheme while leaving existing rights intact . . . ."].) None of these cases suggests that non-FEHA remedies circumscribe the scope of the FEHA.
Finally, the public education provisions of the workers' compensation law support our Conclusion that section 132a is not exclusive. Labor Code section 139.6 provides: "(a) The administrative director shall establish and effect within the Division of Workers' Compensation a continuing program to provide information and assistance concerning the rights, benefits, and obligations of the workers' compensation law to employees and employers subject thereto. The program shall include, but not be limited to, the following: [ ] . . . [ ] (2) The preparation, publishing, and as necessary, updating, of a pamphlet advising injured workers of their basic rights under workers' compensation law, and informing them of rights under . . . the provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act relating to individuals with a disability." (Italics added.) This legislative mandate to inform "injured workers" of their FEHA rights would make little sense if section 132a provided an injured worker's exclusive remedy for disability discrimination.
In Conclusion, we hold that section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy and does not preclude an employee from pursuing FEHA and common law wrongful discharge remedies. We disapprove any cases that suggest otherw
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