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People v. Bell2/27/2003 rties had failed to demonstrate Timblin's presence would materially assist the defense.
As dubious as Bell's testimony about Timblin was, evidence of the defense efforts to find Timblin was arguably relevant. But there was no showing Timblin would give exculpatory testimony. His existence and dimensions (height and build) could be proven by other means. The record does not support the defense claim that Timblin's presence at trial was critical, and therefore the defense efforts to find him were not particularly relevant, if at all relevant. Were the defense allowed to produce evidence that it acted diligently to find Timblin, the People would be entitled to rebut that evidence (e.g., by showing the defense did not act reasonably to find Timblin in the 11 months following the burglary). This endeavor would be tangential, time consuming and confusing, calling for exclusion. (Evid. Code, § 352.) All in all, we conclude the exclusion of evidence of the defense efforts to find Timblin was harmless error, if it was error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) This is not a case where a witness with known exculpatory testimony cannot be brought to trial, and the defense wants to explain why the witness is not before the jury.
b. Other Evidence that Timblin was the Burglar
Defendants also contend the trial court excluded other relevant evidence of third-party culpability, but an examination of the record reveals otherwise.
During cross-examination of Officer MacDonald, the defense asked about the statements LeMaire had made of being detained in Folsom with two other men. After Officer MacDonald testified that LeMaire did not reply when she asked LeMaire who the men were, the following took place:
"Q. Have you ever arrested Vince Timblin?
"A. No.
"Q. Do you know who Vince Timblin is?"
The prosecutor objected, referring to the in limine motion, and the trial court tentatively sustained the objection.
Later, as the parties discussed Detective Jones's anticipated testimony, the prosecutor advised the trial court that he anticipated the defense might question Detective Jones about Timblin. The trial court concluded that because the People had raised no issue regarding Timblin, Timblin was not a relevant subject for cross-examination, but the defense was free to raise "the issue of [the culpability of] others, but you're going to have to have evidence of that." Neither defense attorney voiced any objection.
Still later the trial court precluded the defense from introducing evidence of the subpoena served on Timblin, because the defense had offered no authority apart from "the definition of relevant evidence." Even then, the trial court stated it would reconsider if further authority could be produced. After the lunch break, the defense made the renewed motion for a continuance, described above.
On appeal, Bell asserts what was excluded was evidence of "the existence of Timblin and his presence at the scene, and whether or not the police and prosecutor had looked at Timblin as a suspect. . . . The bench warrant would have proved that Timblin existed and that an attempt had been made to bring him before the jury." The belief of the authorities was not a relevant fact, and, as counsel later concedes, the existence of Timblin was not disputed.
We agree with the Attorney General that appellate counsel have miscast the trial court's ruling. The trial court simply held the evidence could not come in during the People's case because before the third-party evidence would be relevant, there had to be some evidence linking the candidate-culprit to the crime. This ruling was in line with
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