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Martinez v. City of Long Beach2/21/2003
a third person or contributory negligence of the plaintiff was also a concurring cause. (Swaner v. City of Santa Monica (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 789, 799, 804.) This raises only issues of apportionment of fault. (Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 520-522; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1198.) Causation is ordinarily a question of fact. Unless the facts are undisputed or reasonable minds could not differ even after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is error to remove the issue from the trier of fact. (Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist., supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 520, 522 [demurrer]; Espinosa v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1318 [non-suit].)
Here, City argued and the trial court agreed that the sole cause of this accident was negligence of the driver Simon. If we were reviewing findings after a trial on the merits that conclusion would be sustainable. But this appeal is from a summary judgment. We must reverse if there is any evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the condition of the street was a substantial factor in causing the accident.
According to Norma's testimony she regularly crossed at this particular corner because the white lines visible in the street suggested it was the place for pedestrians to cross. A trier of fact could reasonably conclude (1) plaintiffs would not have been at the point of impact but for the appearance of a marked crosswalk, and (2) this was not only a "but for" cause but also a substantial factor in the accident. We cannot say as a matter of law that the appearance of a marked crosswalk in the intersection was not even a concurring cause and that Simon's negligence was the sole cause of the accident.
City again misplaces reliance on Antenor v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 477, taking out of context the court's statement there that "the cause of this tragic occurrence must be laid solely upon a grossly inattentive Buick driver and two equally inattentive plaintiffs." (Id. at p. 485.) The court held that no dangerous condition of government property was proved; the court did not hold that a dangerous condition existed but was not a legal cause of the accident.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Costs on appeal are awarded to plaintiffs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
We concur:
EPSTEIN, J.
HASTINGS, J.
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