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Kerns v. CSE Insurance Group2/19/2003
tion, and its jurisdiction to do so cannot be impaired by section 1008]; Kollander, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 310-314 [Second Dist., Div. Four; courts have inherent constitutional power to control their order and business, including the power to correct their own interim rulings]; Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1156 (Darling) [Second Dist., Div. Seven; "section 1008 does not govern the court's ability, on its own motion, to reevaluate its own interim rulings," and "trial court retains the inherent authority to change its decision at any time prior to the entry of judgment"]; People v. Castello (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246-1250 [Fourth Dist., Div. One; a court has broad power, inherent in the California Constitution, to rehear, reconsider and correct its own interim rulings, and section 1008 cannot impair the exercise of this inherent power].)
Several of these cases have distinguished between a trial court's inherent power to reconsider and correct its own prior rulings sua sponte, and the limitations imposed by section 1008 on the ability of parties to bring motions for reconsideration or to renew an application for an order previously denied. Thus, in Darling, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 1148, the same division of the Second Appellate District that had issued the decision in Morite six years earlier held that section 1008 does not govern a trial court's inherent authority and jurisdiction to reevaluate its own interim rulings on its own motion, and can only be understood to apply to motions for reconsideration brought by litigants. In Darling, the trial court had initially denied the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment. Subsequently, upon its own rereading and reconsideration of papers previously filed with the motions, it vacated its own earlier ruling and granted summary judgment. (Id. at pp. 1150-1154.) On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction under section 1008. The Darling court considered and found inapplicable the line of cases from Division Two of this Appellate District holding section 1008 jurisdictional, reasoning instead that because a trial court has inherent constitutional power to change its decision at any time before entry of judgment, section 1008 cannot govern the court's jurisdiction or authority, on its own motion, to reevaluate and change its own interim rulings at any time before entry of judgment. On this basis the appellate court upheld the trial court's jurisdiction to reconsider and grant sua sponte a motion for summary judgment it had previously denied, even in the absence of new facts or law. (Id. at pp. 1155-1156; see also People v. Castello, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1247-1249 & fn. 5 [section 1008, "by its express terms, governs only a litigant's ability to renew a motion or advance an application, not the court's inherent power to reconsider its own interim rulings"]; In re Jamika W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1450 [section 1008 did not affect trial court's jurisdiction to vacate prior order setting juvenile petition for hearing because it "was not acting on a motion for reconsideration, but was correcting an erroneous ruling"]; Bernstein v. Consolidated American Ins. Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 763, 774 (Bernstein), disapproved on other grounds in Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 841, fn. 13 [Second Dist., Div. Five; section 1008 does not preclude trial court's inherent power to correct, on its own motion, its own prior ruling erroneously denying summary adjudication; reconsideration upheld because "court was not entertaining a motion [by a party] for reconsideration of the prior ruling, but was correcting an erroneous ruling on its own motion"].)
Since Darli
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