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Hall v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado2/27/2003
nel that the proviso included in the introductions does not prohibit consideration of the guidelines as "accepted professional standards" for purposes of an MUR review under § 8-43-501, C.R.S. 2002. Rather, by addressing permissible deviations, the provision simply recognizes that certain cases may require treatment modalities that differ from those generally prescribed in the guidelines. We further agree with the Panel that the introductory limitation does not prohibit consideration of the guidelines as an "accepted professional standard" of care. Instead, the limitation restricts the use of the guidelines to workers' compensation cases and not to other legal proceedings where the propriety of a physician's care may be relevant.
Accordingly, we reject the provider's contentions that the director was not authorized to question the MUR panel members regarding whether the provider had adhered to the treatment guidelines and whether his medical care of claimant complied with accepted professional standards. Also, the provider refers to State Board of Medical Examiners v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1994), and argues that it requires that he be held to the professional standards utilized in medical malpractice claims. However, McCroskey concerned a disciplinary action under the Colorado Medical Practice Act, § 12-36-101, et seq., C.R.S. 2002, and it made no mention of either the Workers' Compensation Act or the MUR process. Consequently, we do not regard it as authority for the proposition that the professional standards used in medical malpractice actions and in disciplinary actions under the Colorado Medical Practice Act must be applied in the MUR process in lieu of the treatment guidelines. Similarly, we reject the provider's claim that his treatment was to be assessed under a national standard because he is a specialist.
II.
The provider also contends that he was denied due process because the MUR process does not afford him the opportunity to present evidence. Again, we disagree.
The provider argues that an adverse decision will impact his reputation and his ability to pursue his chosen occupation. He also asserts that his professional license and his Level I and II accreditation will be threatened. He essentially asserts that these effects amount to imposition of a sanction without any meaningful opportunity to address the questions given to the panel members or otherwise present evidence to rebut the findings of the panel members.
In Carlson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 950 P.2d 663 (Colo. App. 1997), a division of this court determined that a provider's interest in his or her reputation and the ability to pursue prospective employment do not qualify as liberty interests within the context of the MUR proceeding and, therefore, are not subject to constitutional protection. The division also found that an accredited provider possesses no statutory right, either express or implied, to treat any claimant for his or her work-related injury or to continue to provide treatment. Therefore, the division also determined that a provider lacks a recognized property interest that would require the protections of due process.
We conclude that Carlson is dispositive of the provider's due process claim.
The order is affirmed.
JUDGE NEY and JUDGE CARPARELLI concur.
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