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Adjei v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services2/20/2003
Adjei's argument that the word "intermittently" signified employment that was temporary, part-time or seasonal. Instead, the examiner and the Director construed "intermittently" in accordance with its common dictionary definition to mean "coming and going at intervals: not continuous; also occasional." As that construction conforms to the plain meaning of subsection (a-3) and is reasonable, we deem it authoritative. See Mushroom Transp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 761 A.2d 840, 844 (D.C. 2000) (deferring to the Director's considered choice between two reasonable alternative constructions of the Workers' Compensation Act).
The daily delivery run records constituted substantial evidence in support of the finding that Adjei worked in the District only intermittently. See Upchurch v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 783 A.2d 623, 627 (D.C. 2001) (deferring to the Director's decision in a workers' compensation case "as long as the Director's decision flows rationally from the facts, and those facts are supported by substantial evidence on the record"). Adjei's argument that the hearing examiner erred in not discussing more than the most recent two weeks worth of run records is not well taken. While three months of delivery runs were in evidence, and are included in the record on appeal, the two weeks that the examiner considered were representative of the longer period in terms of the nature of Adjei's runs and the infrequency with which he drove into the District. That Adjei made periodic, regular and repeated deliveries in the District during the full three months is consistent with the definition of "intermittently" that the examiner and the Director used and does not undermine the conclusion they reached. As we are satisfied that the additional delivery run evidence that the examiner did not choose to discuss (though we have no reason to believe she did not consider it) would have made no difference to the outcome, we have no reason to remand for the examiner to say so.
III.
We uphold the Director's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affirm.
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