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Bradley v. Brotman2/19/2003
e state maintained that it stipulated to exclude only certain statements. See id. at 34. The trial court agreed with the state and admitted some of McGoey's statements. See id. On appeal, the court determined that " t is clear to us . . . that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties as to the nature or scope of this purported pretrial stipulation." Id. The court discussed the nature of a stipulation in court:
A stipulation is an agreement, admission, or concession made in a judicial proceeding. The essence of a stipulation, however, is an agreement between the parties. However,
(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and
(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the other; . . .
Thus, a "meeting of the minds" by the parties is essential to a stipulation. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts ยง 20 (1979)).
The court further determined that " o avoid the consequences of a stipulation properly entered into, a party must show that the agreement is the product of a fraud, misrepresentation or mistake of fact." Id. at 35 (emphasis added). The third district ultimately determined that there was confusion and no meeting of the minds as to the stipulation regarding the pretrial statements and reversed the conviction for a new trial.
Similarly, from the record in this case it is apparent that there was no "meeting of the minds" as to the admission of Dr. Unis' medical records. The parties attached materially different meanings to the stipulation when admitting the medical records into evidence. Krupnick intended to stipulate to the admission of the records attached to the deposition, and Cocalis was attempting to admit the amended medical notes containing the telephone conversation. It was not necessary for the court to conduct a hearing on whether any fraud was involved. It was clear from the face of the record that there was no meeting of the minds and that a mistake of fact had occurred, from which Krupnick should have been relieved.
Even if we were to call this a unilateral mistake on Krupnick's part to have stipulated to the admission of a record he did not actually review, Bradley would still be entitled to relief. It does not comport with fundamental fairness for an attorney to mislead his opponent and then reap the benefit of his own misconduct. Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.4(a) provides that " lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or otherwise . . . conceal a document or other material that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a pending . . . proceeding . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Here, Cocalis subpoened the medical records without notice in violation of section 455.667(5), failed to notify Krupnick of its receipt, and concealed its receipt from Krupnick when asked directly in court whether other witnesses had been contacted.
The prejudice to Bradley in the admission of the note is apparent. While in deposition Dr. Unis was unsure of the cause of the alopecia, in the telephone note he expressed an opinion that the dog bite could not have been the cause of the condition. Had Krupnick known of the note, he could have called Dr. Unis to explore his opinion and dissipate any prejudice. As it occurred at the very end of the trial, Krupnick had no opportunity to cure the prejudice. Thus, Bradley suffered the type of procedural prejudice referred to in Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (Fla. 1981), from which the court should have granted relief.
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