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Hyundai Motor Company v. Ferayorni2/19/2003
esign, Cunitz made comments implying that the Excel was designed unsafe. For example, the following exchange occurred during his cross-examination:
Q. Under your rationale, Hyundai, to not have been subject to your criticism, would have to put some kind of sticker or label all over that dashboard to satisfy your rationale of warning about safety- critical matters, correct?
A. Not necessarily, sir. They have the option of designing a safer vehicle and obviating and eliminating the need for warnings.
We agree that this testimony given by Dr. Cunitz was improper. However, the trial court properly sustained objections that were made during the testimony. As we held in our previous opinions, we reject Hyundai's argument that the trial court improperly rejected the request to give the jury a special instruction on the findings of the court in `Ferayorni I,' because it would have been too confusing for the jury. Although we previously characterized these comments as error in our opinion which also reversed because of the drunk driver issue, we are persuaded by the estate's motion for rehearing that these comments alone do not warrant a new trial.
Because our earlier opinions had reversed for a new trial on all issues, we had deemed the cross appeal challenging the remittitur moot. However, since we now are affirming, we address the cross-appeal.
The jury awarded $3,380,000 to Paulette's mother and $3,120,000 to Paulette's father for past and future pain and suffering. The different amounts would be consistent with the fact that Paulette's mother had a longer life expectancy. In the order granting the remittitur the court appeared to be motivated primarily by the fact that counsel had only suggested $3,000,000 in closing argument. It is not clear, however, from the transcript, whether counsel was suggesting $3,000,000 total or $3,000,000 for each parent. The argument is just as susceptible of the latter interpretation as the former.
The trial court also relied heavily on the discussion of amounts awarded in Florida for child wrongful death cases in Williams v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Fla. 1988). That case, however, was decided in 1988 and relied on verdicts returned between 1974 and 1987. The Williams opinion recognized that cases decided more than five years earlier were of limited value. 681 F. Supp. at 765.
Substantially higher verdicts have been approved in child wrongful death cases by this court in recent years. See e.g., St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)($4,500,000 to each parent for the death of a nineteen month old); and Kammer v. Hurley, 765 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)($2,500,000 to each parent for a wrongful stillbirth). We conclude that the order granting a remittitur is an abuse of discretion under Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1999). We therefore reverse and remand for entry of a judgment for the full amounts awarded by the jury.
KLEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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