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Wal-Mart Stores2/26/2003
for judicial review was filed in September 2000 and ruled upon in April 2001. Because the agency action under review did not occur until after the revised statute took effect, the district court correctly applied the amended statutory language in its decision on judicial review.
We do not agree, however, with Wal-Mart's contention that the new "substantial evidence" definition requires a "higher threshold" of proof to support the agency's decision. We recently held the revisions were not intended "to increase the intensity of judicial review . . . but to ensure that courts actually follow the level of review consistent with the act." Locate.Plus.Com, 650 N.W.2d at 612. The amended statutory language merely provides more express guidance in the application of pertinent legal principles. Id. In the words of the reporter/draftsman of the amendments, Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(f), as amended, is not "revolutionary" but merely provides a "much more detailed statement of the law intended under the existing IAPA." Arthur E. Bonfield, Amendments to Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (1998) at 68 (1998). Pertinent to this appeal, the amended statute merely reaffirms the notion that courts must not "simply rubber stamp the agency fact finding without engaging in a fairly intensive review of the record to ensure that the fact finding is itself reasonable." Id.
Recent decisions of this court have noted the amended statute's reaffirmation of other long-established principles of administrative review. Two are particularly pertinent here. First, section 17A.19(10)(f)(3) specifically requires the court to consider record proof that detracts from any challenged finding as well as evidence that supports it. Dawson v. Iowa Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 654 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2002); accord Titan Tire Corp. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 641 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Iowa 2002) (citing Burns v. Bd. of Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993)). Second, the amendments to section 17A.19(10)(f) are " ntirely consistent" with the well-established rule that evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. Missman v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 653 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 2002). With these rules in mind we turn to the substantive issues before us.
III. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Commissioner's Awards.
A. Permanent total disability.
The fighting issue on appeal is whether the record before the agency furnished substantial evidence to support the commissioner's award of permanent total disability benefits. Wal-Mart argued in district court, and urges in response to Caselman's appeal, that " he overwhelming medical evidence in this case was that Claimant was able to continue his career as a truck driver." Indeed, this is the precise language used by the district court to justify its reversal of the commissioner's ruling. We are convinced, however, that the record-when viewed more objectively-reveals facts that are far less conclusive and that would, in fact, support the inferences drawn by the commissioner.
Crucial to the deputy commissioner's decision were credibility findings bearing on Caselman's subjective assessment of his inability to meet the standards required by Wal-Mart-or any other trucking company-in terms of strength and stamina. See Iowa Code ยง 17A.19(10)(f)(3) (adequacy of evidence must be judged in light of "determinations of veracity by the presiding officer who personally observed the demeanor of the witnesses"). The deputy began his factual findings this way:
From my observation of [Caselman's] demeanor at hearing including body movements, vocal characteristics, eye contact and facial mannerisms while testifying in a
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