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Wal-Mart Stores2/26/2003 y different standards applicable to receipt of awards in these different realms, we do not believe the deputy's failure to address Wal-Mart's argument on this score detracts materially from its other findings.
It would unduly lengthen this opinion-and add little to our jurisprudence-to recount in further detail all of the facts that support and detract from the deputy commissioner's findings and conclusions. Our task is to "broadly and liberally apply [the deputy's] findings to uphold rather than to defeat the agency's decision." Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d at 632. While those with desk jobs might question how a person with no more than a common back injury could be suddenly rendered totally and permanently disabled, the record before us contains substantial evidence to support that conclusion. The fact that different inferences could be drawn from the same record does not diminish the soundness of the deputy commissioner's findings and conclusions " hen that record is viewed as a whole." See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3).
Quoting the commissioner in Al-Gharib, this court observed that " otal disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness." Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d at 633. The question is whether Caselman's work-related injury has "wholly disable from performing work that experience, training, intelligence, and physical capacities would otherwise permit to perform." Id. Credible evidence in the record made before the agency supports the deputy's conclusion that Caselman is no longer able to engage in employment for which he is fitted. See id. And although, in the deputy's words, the parties' vocational experts held "radically divergent" views on this point, that fact did not thereby free the court to substitute its judgment for the presiding officer who observed the testimony first-hand. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of an order affirming the agency's award.
B. Penalty award. Caselman also challenges the district court's reversal of the agency's $8000 award of penalty benefits. He claims substantial evidence supports the award based on the commissioner's finding that Wal-Mart delayed unreasonably in rectifying its original error of paying under lower, Kansas rates and thereafter making several payments late. Wal-Mart counters that reversal and remand were justified under the record. It does not deny, however, that some amount of penalty benefits are warranted in this case.
At the outset Wal-Mart challenges the commissioner's consideration of other recent cases in which penalty benefits had been assessed against the company. However in laying out the factors the commissioner may consider when imposing penalty benefits, this court has specifically included "the prior penalties imposed against the employer." Robbennolt v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 555 N.W.2d 229, 238 (Iowa 1996); accord Meyers v. Holiday Express Corp., 557 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Iowa 1996). Such evidence was properly considered by the deputy in fashioning the award and furnished no grounds for reversal of the award by the district court on judicial review.
Penalty benefits are authorized under Iowa Code section 86.13. The relevant portion of that statute states:
If a delay in commencement or termination of benefits occurs without reasonable or probable cause or excuse, the workers' compensation commissioner shall award benefits in addition to those benefits payable under this chapter . . . up to fifty percent of the amount of benefits that were unreasonably delayed or denied. Iowa Code § 86.13.
The key to determining whether penalty benefits should be awarded is whether the employer's actions were reasonable. Gilbert v.
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