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Irikzarry v. Industrial Commission2/25/2003
ding, however, the Commission found no such connection regarding the alleged injuries to Irizarry's head, neck, lower back, and right shoulder. Furthermore, in the first section 19(b) proceeding, the Commission awarded medical expenses for treatment to Irizarry's neck, right shoulder, and back. Yet in the final proceeding the Commission stated that all such treatment failed to support an award.
Irizarry argues that the causation determination from the final proceeding violated the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Since arbitrator Caliendo had already decided the causation issue, Irizarry asserts, Dynaweld was barred from raising it again before arbitrator Akemann. We agree that a bar existed, but not under res judicata or collateral estoppel. Those doctrines are invoked by final judgments in separate, prior actions. Although Irizarry's claim has proceeded through various stages, it still comprises only a single action. Under such circumstances, the bar Irizarry seeks stems from the "law of the case" doctrine. See Heller Financial, Inc. v. Johns-Byrne Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d 681 (1994).
That doctrine has been explained as follows:
"The rule of the law of the case is a rule of practice, based on sound policy that, where an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter and the unreversed decision of a question of law or fact made during the course of litigation settles that question for all subsequent stages of the suit." McDonald's Corp. v. Vittorio Ricci Chicago , Inc., 125 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1086-87 (1984).
At the section 19(b) stage, arbitrator Caliendo determined that a causal connection existed between Irizarry's industrial accident and the alleged injuries to his left knee, neck, right shoulder, and back. The determination became a final judgment from which Dynaweld did not appeal. The determination thus became the law of the case, and Dynaweld was barred from raising the causation issue again during the final proceeding. Accordingly, arbitrator Akemann and the Commission erred in revisiting the issue.
Our holding does not apply to Irizarry's claim of a head injury . The record does not indicate that arbitrator Caliendo found a causal connection regarding such an injury.
2. Additional TTD, Medical Expenses, and Permanent Impairment
During the final proceeding, the Commission denied TTD benefits and medical expenses for the period since the second 19(b) hearing. The Commission also evaluated Irizarry's permanent impairment at 40% loss of use of his left leg. As noted above, the Commission erroneously considered that the requisite causal connection never existed between Irizarry's accident and the injuries to his neck, right shoulder, and back. We do not know how much, if any, impact that error had on the Commission's decisions regarding TTD benefits, medical expenses, and permanent impairment. We thus remand for new determinations in these areas.
According to the dissent, there is no need to remand because the Commission "has already found there is no objective evidence of neurological or orthopedic injury to the head, neck, lower back, or right shoulder." Slip op. at 19. But the dissent omits a key part of the Commission's statement: the qualifying words, "as a result of the * accident." The Commission discounted the aforementioned injuries by finding that they were never causally connected to Irizarry's industrial accident, not by finding that their former connection to the accident had ceased at some point without later resuming. Only the latter finding could sustain the result the Commission reached.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reaso
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