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Williams v. State2/7/2003
tting the offense, and conduct before and after the offense may be considered in determining whether aiding may be inferred.
Mere presence at the scene of an alleged crime or failure to oppose the crime is not, in of itself, aiding[,] inducing or causing the commission of a crime. Neither is negative acquiescence sufficient standing alone. There must be some conduct of an affirmative nature on the part of a defendant in order for that defendant to be criminally liable as an accessory. It must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had knowledge of and participated in the commission of the crime. Appellant's App. pp. 170-71 (emphasis added).
The last two sentences of Final Instruction 10C state that some conduct of an affirmative nature is required in order for a defendant to be found criminally liable and that the defendant's participation in the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. These two sentences explain the language of Final Instruction 10D and allow a reasonable juror to not have considered 10D to create a mandatory presumption. Walker, 769 N.E.2d at 1168. They advise the jury that they do not have to presume Williams's intent for his confederate's crimes just because he was present. Final Instruction 10C requires that there must have been some sort of affirmative conduct, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in order for the jury to find Williams guilty.
Williams argues that because in Walker a similar instruction was found not to be curative, Final Instruction 10C cannot be viewed to cure the language in 10D. But the instruction at issue in Walker did not state that it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the crime and participated by some affirmative conduct. Instructions 10C and D, when read together, require that intent to participate must be proven. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it read Final Instruction 10D to the jury.
III. Insufficient Evidence
Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is well-settled. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Cox v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1025, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). We only consider the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id. Where there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment, it will not be disturbed. Armour v. State, 762 N.E.2d 208, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for murder because there was ample evidence presented that Townsend's death was caused by the intervening cause of medical malpractice. Williams contends that because no one was present in Townsend's room when his trach tube became plugged and because there was no indication that any of the hospital staff saw a call light from Townsend's room the intervening cause of medical malpractice actually caused Townsend's death. "An intervening cause is an independent force that breaks the causal connection between the actions of the defendant and the injury ." Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 928 (Ind. 1999). Usually, a defendant is responsible for the death of the decedent if the injuries inflicted contributed either mediately or immediately to the death. Ewing v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ind. 1999). In order for an intervening cause to break the chain of criminal responsibility, it must be so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for the actual result. Id.
In the present case, Townsend was shot multiple times by Williams and Cleve when they attempted to rob Townsend on December 17
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