Roland Imperial v. Drapeau8/27/1998
apeau filed a complaint against Imperial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging defamation. After Imperial had moved to dismiss, and Drapeau had amended his complaint, Imperial moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, ruling that the publications of the matter complained of were either absolutely privileged or were conditionally privileged, without any evidence of malice.
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, reversed and remanded. That court, in rejecting absolute immunity, said that Imperial's request for an investigation at the end of his seven-page letter "cannot insulate defamatory remarks." The court reasoned that, were it so to hold, "all defamatory statements, if accompanied by a vague request for some kind of an investigation, would be completely immune from redress. That is not, and should not, be the law."
We granted Imperial's petition for certiorari and Drapeau's conditional cross-petition. Of the many issues raised, we need consider only the question of absolute immunity. In doing so we apply the standard of review for a grant of summary judgment, namely, whether the trial court was legally correct. Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204, 68 0 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996). As we explain below, the circuit court was legally correct in its alternate holding that absolute immunity applied.
The applicability of absolute privilege to circumstances like those here present evolved from the common law rule under which a person is fully protected from any threat of potential liability in defamation for testimony given as a witness in a judicial proceeding. Rosenberg v. Helinski, 328 Md. 664, 676, 616 A.2d 866, 872 (1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 924, 113 S. Ct. 3041, 125 L. Ed. 2d 727 (1993); Odyniec v. Schneider, 322 Md. 520, 526, 588 A.2d 786, 789 (1991); Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 170, 498 A.2d 269, 272 (1985); Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1, 3, 415 A.2d 292, 293 (1980); Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285 Md. 699, 704, 402 A.2d 897, 899 (1979); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 588 (1977).
This absolute privilege shields speakers from liability even if their motives were malicious, or they knew the statement was false, or their conduct was otherwise unreasonable. Rosenberg, 328 Md. at 676, 616 A.2d at 872; Odyniec, 322 Md. at 527, 588 A.2d at 789; Adams, 288 Md. at 3, 415 A.2d at 293; Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 164, 14 A. 505, 511 (1888). Moreover, the privilege applies even if the allegedly defamatory statement is irrelevant to the proceeding. Miner, 304 Md. at 171, 498 A.2d at 272; Korb, 285 Md. at 701-02, 402 A.2d at 898.
The longstanding rationale for the privilege is that it is of "great importance to the administration of justice that witnesses should testify with minds absolutely free from the apprehension of being annoyed by civil actions for any thing they may say as witnesses ...." Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 198, 17 A. 1056, 1057 (1889). See Odyniec, 322 Md. at 528, 588 A.2d at 789-90; Miner, 304 Md. at 171, 498 A.2d at 272; Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 192, 434 A.2d 547, 549 (1981); Adams, 288 Md. at 8, 415 A.2d at 295.
As a matter of public policy, the balance is struck heavily in favor of the free disclosure of information during a judicial proceeding. In order to achieve this balance, those who participate in the judicial process must be able to do so without the specter of potential civil liability for defamation hanging over their heads. Rosenberg, 328 Md. at 676-77, 616 A.2d at 872; Odyniec, 322 Md. at 528, 588 A.2d at 790; McDermott v. Hughley, 317 Md. 12, 23-24, 561 A.2d 1038, 1044 (1989). See also W.P. Keeton & W. Prosser, Prosser and Keeto
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