 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
LeBlanc v. Friedman1/29/2003
he court held that the release did not bar the present claim if the parties had made a mutual mistake of fact in not realizing that the left ovary existed, and thus had intended that the release apply only to injuries caused by the medical instrument. Given that the instrument manufacturer and a doctor assisting in the laparoscopy had been named as parties to the release and that the foundation had represented to the Leblancs that the release was intended to pertain to the instrument incident, the court concluded that there existed a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the parties had intended that the release cover Dr. Friedman's negligent failure to detect and remove the left ovary. The court was reassured in its position by the relatively small sum of money paid to the Leblancs for the release and the fact that the couple did not consult an attorney before signing it. This court granted further appellate review.
2. Discussion. An order granting summary judgment will be upheld if "the judge ruled on undisputed material facts and those rulings were correct as a matter of law." Aldrich v. ADD Inc., 437 Mass. 213, 218 n.9 (2002).
The central issue in this summary judgment motion is a mixed question of law and fact: whether any of the injuries alleged by the Leblancs fall outside the scope of the August 17, 1992, release discharging Dr. Friedman's liability. Because the interpretation of a contract is a question of law for the courts, Lumber Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zoltek Corp., 419 Mass. 704, 707 (1995), and releases are a form of contract, see Sharon v. Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 105 (2002), the question has a legal element: What acts does the release cover? If there are facts material to this mixed question in dispute, summary judgment cannot be granted.
The Appeals Court believed that there were material facts in dispute, and based this belief on our holding in LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce Co., supra. In LaFleur, the plaintiff was injured when a forklift blade fell on his toe, spraining it and also, unbeknownst to anyone, aggravating a latent arterial disease from which he suffered. LaFleur settled with his employer and signed a release that made no mention of whether it covered "unknown" injuries. He later discovered the disease and sued. This court first held that because the release was ambiguous, "the intention of the parties controlling," id. at 260. It then went on to hold that there was a material question of fact as to "whether there has been a conscious and deliberate intention by the parties to release claims for injuries existing but not known to them at the time of the agreement," id., and that extrinsic evidence on the subject could be introduced to ascertain the parties' intent. Because the intentions of the parties were decisive in that case, the dispute regarding those intentions was material and the case was properly remanded for trial.
The intentions of the parties here are not similarly in dispute. Unlike the release at issue in LaFleur, the release signed by the Leblancs contained a provision discharging the four parties from liability for injuries both "known or unknown" at the time of signing, and specifically recited their intention that the release includes "injuries currently existing but unknown to either or both of the parties." Because the release provided for such coverage, the subjective beliefs of the parties as to whether the release covered unknown injuries is thus irrelevant. This does not, however, end our inquiry into the pivotal issue in this case: whether the release covered all "unknown" injuries which may have resulted from any care provided to Mrs. Leblanc before it was signed on August 17, or just those "unknown" injuries associated w
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Massachusetts Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|