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Smith v. Hull8/27/1998
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As to Dr. Matsen, Smiths scheduled his deposition and insisted on going forward despite knowledge that opposing counsel was unavailable on this date. Again, the health-care providers were forced to seek court intervention. Although Smiths eventually deposed Dr. Matsen, he, nonetheless, failed to testify as to the applicable standard of care and breach, as discussed above.
Finally, Smiths sought an order from the trial court that would have allowed them to depose Dr. Joseph P. Iannotti, a non-testifying expert. The court concluded that Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) and (B), M.R.Civ.P., precluded Smiths taking this deposition absent exceptional circumstances which did not exist.
Smiths have failed in their burden to persuade us that they were prejudiced or that the District Court abused its discretion in any of these rulings. Accordingly, as to this issue, we hold that the court did not err.
IV.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it ordered that the 1995 deposition of Dr. Matsen could not be used as evidence in this case?
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the district court and will not be reversed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion. Peschke v. Carroll College (1996), 280 Mont. 331, 342, 929 P.2d 874, 881 (citation omitted).
On July 17, 1996, the District Court denied Smiths' motion for leave to use a 1995 deposition of Dr. Matsen. The court subsequently also denied reconsideration of this ruling. The deposition which was the subject of Smiths' motion was taken in another case that did not involve the health-care providers and which the health-care providers did not attend. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smiths' motion to use this deposition at trial. Without elaborating on the obvious reasons supporting the court's ruling, Smiths' argument on this issue can be disposed of with the observation that, if Dr. Matsen had something to say of importance to their case in his 1995 deposition, they certainly had more than adequate opportunity and sufficient time to put this testimony into the record two years later when they deposed him in 1997. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smiths' motion for leave to use Dr. Matsen's 1995 deposition.
Having reviewed the record in this case and having considered the issues raised by Smiths and their various arguments on appeal, we are not persuaded that the trial court committed any reversible error in its rulings and orders.
Affirmed.
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