State v. Green7/30/1998
tors' ages, is on the ascendancy in our state and nation. Similarly, it is the general consensus that serious youthful offenders must be dealt with more severely than has recently been the case in the juvenile system. These tides of thought may ebb in the future, but for now, they predominate in the arena of ideas. Thus, we conclude that sentencing a thirteen-year-old defendant to mandatory life imprisonment for commission of a first-degree sexual offense is within the bounds of society's current and evolving standards of decency.
Having found defendant's sentence to be within evolving standards of decency, we must nonetheless examine whether it is otherwise excessive in a constitutional sense. E.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 874-75 (noting that public standards of decency are not always conclusive and that punishment must neither inflict unnecessary pain nor be grossly disproportionate to the crime). Defendant maintains his punishment is excessive because it is disproportionate to the crime committed. This is based on the assertion that mandatory life imprisonment is a penalty too harsh for a thirteen-year-old "child" convicted of first-degree sexual offense. We do not agree.
It is well established that punishment within the maximum fixed by the legislature through statute is not cruel and unusual unless the punishment provisions of the statute itself are unconstitutional. State v. Williams, 295 N.C. 655, 679, 249 S.E.2d 709, 725 (1978). This Court has frequently enunciated the principle that a criminal sentence fixed by the legislature must be proportionate to the crime committed. E.g., Peek, 313 N.C. at 275, 328 S.E.2d at 255; State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 786, 309 S.E.2d 436, 440 (1983). However, in Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836, the United States Supreme Court held that outside of the capital context, there is no general proportionality principle inherent in the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 992-94, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 863-64; see also Bronson, 333 N.C. at 81, 423 S.E.2d at 780. Indeed, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment "does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are `grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 869 (Kennedy, J., Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637, 647 (1983)); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 389 (1980) ("grossly disproportionate"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982, 989 (1977) ("grossly out of proportion" sentences prohibited); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371, 54 L. Ed. 793, 800 (1910) ("greatly disproportioned" sentences prohibited). Only in exceedingly rare non-capital cases will sentences imposed be so grossly disproportionate as to be considered cruel or unusual. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 389; Peek, 313 N.C. at 276, 328 S.E.2d at 255.
Defendant claims his sentence of life imprisonment is grossly disproportionate because of his young age. While the chronological age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in determining whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime, the Court's review is not limited to this factor. The Court may look at other factors, including the severity of the crime and defendant's eligibility for parole. Moreover, as in capital sentencing proceedings, the number of years a defendant has spent on this planet is not solely determinative of his "age." State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 372, 307 S.E.2d 304, 333 (1983). Due to factors such as life experience, knowledge level, psychological
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