Serna v. Kingston Enterprises9/26/2002
8-41-104, C.R.S. 2002 (emphasis added); see also § 8-41-102, C.R.S. 2002 (abolishing employee's remedies against employer for or on account on employee's "death" or "personal injury").
Conversely, however, an employee does not, under the WCA, surrender any cause of action for injuries apart from "personal injuries." See Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 403 (Del. 2000)(workers' compensation "exclusivity provision does not apply to all injuries arising out of and in the course of employment but, rather, only to `personal' injuries").
No Colorado appellate opinion has determined the precise meaning of the terms "personal injury " or "personal injuries" in §§ 8-41-102 and 8- 41-104. Their meaning may, however, be discerned from the type of injuries for which the WCA provides a remedy. The express purpose of the WCA is to provide "quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits," § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. 2002, for job -related physical or mental injuries. See §§ 8-41-301(2)(a) (mental impairment), 8-42-107 (physical injuries), C.R.S. 2002; Lucero v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 732 P.2d 642, 647 (Colo. 1987)(WCA provides compensation for "specified physical or mental injuries").
We conclude that, as used in the WCA, the terms "personal injury " and "personal injuries" refer to the job -related physical or mental injuries of an employee, see 3 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law ch. 55 at 55-1 (2002)("`Personal injury' includes any harmful change in the body"), and that, consequently, the WCA's exclusivity provision bars actions for or on account of such injuries of an employee.
Here, Serna seeks redress from defendant not on account of physical or mental injuries she sustained, but, rather, on account of the economic liability she incurred after she injured others. Because this economic liability does not qualify as a compensable "personal injury " under the WCA, her indemnity action against defendant is not barred by the WCA. See, e.g., Williams v. Caruso, 966 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Del. 1997)("claims for injuries to [employee's] economic interests" were not preempted by Delaware's workers' compensation statute); Gomez v. Acquistapace, 50 Cal. App. 4th 740, 749, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 821, 826 (1996)("injuries which trigger application of the exclusive remedy rule are injuries `to the worker's person, as opposed to his property'"); Lord v. Souder, supra, 748 A.2d at 403 (harm affecting "a proprietary or financial interest" is "not a `personal injury' within the purview of the Workers' Compensation statute"); Cole v. Chandler, 752 A.2d 1189, 1196 (Me. 2000)("economic or reputational injuries, if any, do not constitute personal injuries, as they are not physical or mental injuries," and "recovery of such damages is not precluded by the exclusivity provision").
Defendant cites United Cable Television of Jeffco, Inc. v. Montgomery LC, Inc., 942 P.2d 1230, 1232-33 (Colo. App. 1996), for the proposition that employers are immune under the WCA for common law indemnity claims. However, that case dealt with a third-party suit against an employer seeking indemnification for monies paid out in connection with an employee's physical injury . Further, the division in that case stated that "there is an exception to the [WCA's] exclusive remedy clause where an express contract or pre-existing legal relationship exists." United Cable Television of Jeffco, Inc. v. Montgomery LC, Inc., supra, 942 P.2d at 1233.
Here, defendant and Serna, as employer and employee, had a pre- existing legal relationship, which allowed Serna to bring her indemnity claim despite the WCA.
B. Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
Serna next contends that the trial cou
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